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INTRODUCTION 
The Miranda conundrum runs something like this. If the Miranda 
decision represents true constitutional interpretation, and all un­
warned statements taken during custodial interrogation are "com­
pelled" within the meaning of the Self-Incrimination Clause, the im-
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peachment and "fruits" exceptions to Miranda should fall.1 If it is not 
true constitutional interpretation, than the Court has no business re­
versing state criminal convictions for its violation. I offer here what I 
hope is a satisfying answer to this conundrum, on both descriptive and 
normative levels, that justifies not only Miranda but a host of similar 
Warren, Burger, and Rehnquist Court decisions as well. In Part I, I in­
troduce and define the terms "constitutional prophylactic rule," "con­
stitutional safe harbor rule," and "constitutional incidental right,"2 and 
attempt to legitimate their use. I further demonstrate that constitu­
tional criminal procedure is so flush with such prophylactic and safe 
harbor rules and incidental rights that trying to eliminate them now, 
by either reversing a large number of criminal procedure cases or 
"constitutionalizing" all of those holdings, would do more harm than 
good. I propose that we accept the fact that these rules and rights are a 
fixed part of our constitutional landscape, and focus instead on mini­
mizing their risks and maximizing their benefits. 
Thus, in Part II, I suggest that we can highlight their benefits; en­
couraging dialogue and cooperation between the federal judiciary and 
state and federal executive and legislative officers, fostering experi­
mentation with new procedures that may work better, and providing 
the flexibility to respond to new empirical and social science data 
without reversing constitutional decisions; and cabin their risks; in­
fringing on principles of federalism and separation of powers, hard­
ening rules that should be flexible enough to respond to changing 
facts, and deflecting attention away from actual constitutional viola­
tions; by caution, deference, and what I call "truth-in-labeling." Cau­
tion requires the Court to refrain from creating prophylactic or safe 
harbor rules and incidental rights except where it clearly identifies the 
mandate of the constitutional clause at issue and/or the values under­
lying that clause, and then explains why a rule or right is necessary to 
protect or adjudicate that clause. Deference requires the Court to 
warn the other branches of the federal government and all branches of 
the state governments that some action is necessary, and to act itself 
only if the other actors fail to offer alternative procedures that are 
within an acceptable range of functionality. Truth-in-labeling requires 
the Court to identify each doctrinal rule it creates as being either an 
explicit constitutional rule or remedy, or a prophylactic or safe harbor 
1. These exceptions fall because they are not based upon the premise that the constitu­
tional clause itself contains these exceptions to its implementation, but rather upon a holding 
that the constitutional clause was not actually infringed. See, e. g. , Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 
298, 306 (1985) (noting that Miranda "serves the Fifth Amendment and sweeps more 
broadly than the Fifth Amendment itself. It may be triggered even in the absence of a Fifth 
Amendment violation"). 
2. The term "prophylactic rule" has been used by the scholars and the Court, though not 
as I define it. I believe the terms "constitutional incidental right" and "constitutional safe 
harbor rule" are my own invention, at least in this context. 
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rule or incidental right, so that there is a clear signal that modification 
may be permissible. 
Finally, in Part Ill, I examine Chief Justice Rehnquist's embar­
rassing failure in Dickerson v. United States to acknowledge, much less 
resolve, the Miranda conundrum. Inexplicably, Miranda is no longer a 
prophylactic rule (dashing all hopes for dialogue with other branches 
and improved alternatives), though neither is it "true" constitutional 
interpretation. Thus, an opportunity for a Court description of the 
status and justification for the Miranda warnings, as well as an ac­
knowledgment of the status and justification for the host of other 
Court-created rules and rights that do not precisely track the constitu­
tional clause that they concern, was squandered. 
I. IDENTIFYING AND JUSTIFYING PROPHYLACTIC RULES, 
SAFE HARBORS, AND INCIDENTAL RIGHTS 
I have argued elsewhere that the Miranda decision can best be ex­
plained, both normatively and descriptively, as a constitutional pro­
phylactic rule designed to assist the Court in protecting the privilege 
against self-incrimination.3 The fate of Miranda's exceptions depends 
upon how prophylactic rules are defined and the purposes they serve. 
A foray through constitutional criminal procedure has convinced me 
that the Miranda decision is far from unique. There are quite a num­
ber of decisions where the Court, unable to precisely track the consti­
tutional criminal procedural guarantee before it, created devices that 
assist it in identifying and adjudicating constitutional violations, and 
imposed those devices upon the federal executive branch and the 
states. I categorized these devices as constitutional prophylactic rules, 
constitutional safe harbor rules, and constitutional incidental rights. 
The conceptual framework I develop in this Article for identifying and 
formulating these rules and rights can be applied not just to the 
Miranda decision and its exceptions, but throughout constitutional 
criminal procedure. 
A "constitutional prophylactic rule" is a judicially-created doc­
trinal rule or legal requirement determined by the Court as appropri­
ate for deciding whether an explicit or "true" federal constitutional 
rule is applicable. It may be triggered by less than a showing that the 
explicit rule was violated, but provides approximately the same result 
as a showing that the explicit rule was violated. It is appropriate only 
3. See Susan R. Klein, Miranda Deconstitutionalized: When the Self-Incrimination Clause 
and the Civil Rights Act Collide, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 417, 482-83 (1994) (suggesting that it is 
the Court's obligation under the Constitution to create remedies or procedures necessary to 
safeguard a particular constitutional provision otherwise at risk, and, while these remedies 
and procedures may be "temporary and/or conditional" this '.' 'constitutional common law' 
has the same status as 'true' constitutional interpretation" for purposes of civil rights ac­
tions). 
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upon two determinations: first, that simply providing relief upon a 
showing that the explicit right was violated is ineffective; second, that 
use of this rule will be more effective and involve only acceptable 
costs. It should be clear that, thus defined, a constitutional prophylac­
tic rule is purely instrumental; it strives to achieve the rule and/or 
value inherent in that constitutional clause, and has no utility outside 
of that function . 
. . Conversely, a "constitutional safe harbor rule" is a judicially cre­
ated procedure that, if properly followed by the government actor, in­
sulates the government from the argument that the constitutional 
clause at issue was violated. It may allow conduct that violates the ex­
plicit constitutional rule to which it applies. It is appropriate only upon 
two showings: first, that providing relief every time an explicit right is 
violated is not feasible; second, that the use of this rule will involve 
only acceptable costs. 
The line between a prophylactic rule and safe harbor rule is this: A 
prophylactic rule potentially overprotects the constitutional clause at 
issue, while a safe harbor rule potentially underprotects it.4 That is, a 
prophylactic rule will prohibit some government behavior that would 
otherwise be declared constitutional without the rule, and the safe 
harbor rule will allow some government behavior that would other­
wise be declared unconstitutional without the rule. 
Closely related to a prophylactic rule is a "constitutional incidental 
right," a judicially-created procedure determined by the Court as the 
appropriate relief for the violation of an explicit or "true" constitu­
tional rule or a prophylactic rule. It is appropriate only upon two de­
terminations: first, some relief is warranted, but no particular proce­
dure is mandated by the constitutional rule itself; second, the relief is 
effective and involves only acceptable costs. A constitutional inciden­
tal right is likewise purely instrumental; it seeks to advance the text of 
or values underlying the constitutional rule violated by either deter­
ring future violations of that clause or reducing the harm visited upon 
an aggrieved party, it has no utility outside of those functions. 
The line between prophylactic and safe harbor rules and incidental 
rights is this: An incidental right is what the court provides after the 
violation of the constitution or prophylactic rule has already occurred. 
A prophylactic or safe harbor rule is a standard for government be­
havior designed to reduce violations or make alleged violations easier 
to adjudicate. If the rule works, there will be no recognized violation 
and no incidental right offered. If the prophylactic rule, safe harbor 
4. See Appendices A and B for Venn diagrams providing examples of how a prophylac­
tic rule can over- but not underprotect a constitutional right, and a safe harbor rule can un­
der but not overprotect a constitutional right. If the reader were to draw Venn diagrams for 
the other prophylactic and safe harbor rules discussed in sections A and B, she would find 
similarly that the all the prophylactic rules overprotect, and all the safe harbors underpro­
tect. 
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rule, or explicit constitutional rule is violated, then the question of an 
incidental right arises. 
These definitions and categorizations build upon and expand the 
groundbreaking work by Professor Henry Monaghan, who declared 
"remedial rules" a species of "constitutional common law" over 
twenty-five years ago.5 Almost fifteen years after Professor 
Monaghan's article, Professor David Strauss, while not offering a con­
stitutional theory supporting prophylactic rules, noted that the use of 
such rules to protect First Amendment values are a fixed part of our 
constitutional landscape.6 The Court itself sometimes uses the term 
"prophylactic rule," though it never defines or attempts to justify it. 
On the other hand, the Department of Justice under former Attorney 
General Edwin Meese, Professor Joseph Grano, and Justice Antonin 
Scalia have forcefully argued that prophylactic rules such as the 
Miranda warnings are constitutionally illegitimate because not 
authorized under Article III.7 
5. See Henry P. Monaghan, Foreword: Constitutional Common Law, 89 HARV. L. REV. 
1, 2-3 (1975) ("[A] surprising amount of what passes as authoritative constitutional 'interpre­
tation' is best understood as something of a quite different order - a substructure of sub­
stantive, procedural, and remedial rules drawing their inspiration and authority from, but 
not required by, various constitutional provisions; in short, a constitutional common law 
subject to amendment, modification, or even reversal by Congress."). 
6. David A. Strauss, The Ubiquity of Prophylactic Rules, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 190, 190 
(1988) (identifying prophylactic rules protecting the First Amendment, and suggesting that 
" 'prophylactic' rules are not exceptional measures of questionable legitimacy but are a cen­
tral and necessary feature of constitutional law"); see also Mitchell N. Berman, Coercion 
Without Baselines: Unconstitutional Conditions in Three Dimension, 90 GEO. L.J. 1 (forth­
coming 2001) (arguing that the rules of germaneness and proportionality that emerge from 
Nol/an and Dolan respectively are really prophylactic rules designed to enforce the right not 
to be coerced into waiving one's Fifth Amendment right to just compensation for a taking); 
Brian K. Landsberg, Safeguarding Constitutional Rights: The Uses and Limits of Prophylactic 
Rules, 66 TENN. L. REV. 925 (1999) (comparing judicially-created prophylactic rules to 
similar Talmudic rules); David A. Strauss, Miranda, the Constitution, and Congress, 99 
MICH. L. REV. 958 (2001). 
7. See U.S. Dep't of Just., Truth in Crim. Just. Rep. No. 1, Rep. to the Att'y Gen. on the 
Law of Pre-Trial Interrogation (1986), reprinted in 22 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 437 (1989) (as­
serting that Miranda "constituted a usurpation of legislative and administrative powers"); see 
also Dickerson v. United States, 120 S. Ct. 2326, 2337 (2000) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (noting 
that the power to impose prophylactic rules upon Congress and the States "is an immense 
and frightening antidemocratic power, and it does not exist"); Joseph D. Grano, Miranda's 
Constitutional Diffirnlties: A Reply to Professor Schulhofer, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 174 (1988); 
Joseph D. Grano, Prophylactic Rules in Criminal Procedure: A Question of A rticle Ill Le­
gitimacy, 80 Nw. U. L. REV. 100 (1985) [hereinafter Grano, Prophylactic Rules] ; Stephen J. 
Markman, The Fifth Amendment and Custodial Questioning: A Response to "Reconsidering 
Miranda," 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 938 (1987) (defending the finding of the Department of 
Justice report); Thomas S. Schrock & Robert C. Welsh, Reconsidering the Constitutional 
Common Law, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1117, 1124 (1978) (suggesting that prophylactic rules are 
"neither constitutional nor common law but pragmatism without either precedent or princi­
ple - judicial realism radicalized and rampant"). 
March 2001] Prophylactic Rules 1035 
My response is twofold. First, scholars have already offered the 
theoretical response.8 Though there is no general federal common law 
displacing state rules of decisions where state law governs,9 there is 
unquestionably federal common law created to interpret federal stat­
utes as displacing conflicting state law,10 to protect enclaves of federal 
interest,11 to provide rules of decision where the Court is granted ju­
risdiction,12 and to flesh-out federal constitutional commands.° 
Second, I offer a purely practical response. The Court cannot per­
form miracles; if a constitutional theory requires the Court do the im­
possible, there is something wrong with the theory, not with the Court. 
As I demonstrate throughout the remainder of this Article, generating 
constitutional prophylactic rules and incidental rights to protect con­
stitutional values is a beneficial and necessary function of the judici­
ary. 
The Miranda decision is a perfect example of this. The Court tried 
for thirty years to ensure that coerced confessions were not admitted 
in criminal trials by examining each confession which came before it.14 
The use of the "totality of the circumstance" test,15 requiring the Court 
to thoroughly examine every detail about the individual defendant and 
the particular interrogation at bar, taught the Court two things. One, it 
was incapable of correctly identifying which custodial interrogations 
resulted in compulsion and which did not. The Court never offered a 
workable definition of "voluntary"; there were too many factors which 
8. See generally PAUL BATOR ET AL., THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL 
SYSTEM 700, 770 (2d ed. 1973); Martha A. Field, Sources of Law: The Scope of Federal 
Common Law, 99 HARV. L. REV. 881 (1986) (suggesting federal courts have broad power to 
create federal common law based upon statutes, jurisdictional grants, and the federal consti­
tution). 
9. See Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). 
10. See Buckman Co. v. Plaintiffs' Legal Comm., 121 S. Ct. 101 (2001) (holding that 
state law fraud claims are impliedly preempted by the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act). 
11. See, e.g., Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363, 366 (1943) ("(D]uties of 
the United States on commercial paper which it issues are governed by federal rather than 
local law."). 
12. For example, the Court has created a body of common law rules of decision in con­
troversies between states and in cases of admiralty, based upon Article Ill's grant of jurisdic­
tion. See, e.g. , Texas v. New Jersey, 379 U.S. 674, 677 (1965) (discussing conflicting claims to 
tax); Kossick v. United Fruit Co., 365 U.S. 731 (1961) (noting that the federal law of admi­
ralty is necessary for uniformity and consistency). 
13. See supra notes 3, 5-6. 
14. See, e.g., Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503 (1963); Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 
315 (1959); Payne v. Arkansas, 356 U.S. 560 (1958); Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 
(1936). 
15. The Court examined the conduct of the police in interrogating the suspect (threats 
or promises, trickery, withholding food and water, the duration of the questioning, plays 
upon sympathy, and the use of family and friends) and the characteristics of the suspect that 
might make him susceptible to coercion (age, intelligence, education, psychological and 
physical limitations). 
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went into the indeterminate "voluntariness" equation; it was too diffi­
cult to reconstruct an often lengthy interrogation session after the fact; 
and it could not review a sufficient number of cases. Second, the Court 
discovered that law enforcement was receiving no guidance on which 
interrogation techniques were acceptable and which were not, which 
in turn led to further constitutional violations. Thus the Court, in de­
ciding to institute the Miranda warnings, did not have the option of 
precisely adhering to the constitutional clause at issue; rather, it was 
forced either to under- or overprotect the constitutional right. Without 
the Miranda warnings, the Court will inadvertently admit some con­
fessions that are compelled. With the Miranda warnings, the Court 
will exclude some confessions that were not compelled. It seems to me 
that either choice can plausibly be justified as constitutionally legiti­
mate. There is no principled reason to believe that when a judicially 
enforceable rule of constitutional law cannot perfectly map the consti­
tutional right at issue, the Constitution favors judicial underprotection 
over judicial overprotection. This is especially true when constitution­
ally protected individual liberties are at stake.16 
It is true that the Court may not hear a sufficient number of cases 
interpreting nonconstitutional issues to ensure that lower state and 
federal courts always get it right. I do not believe, however, that this 
calls for creating prophylactic rules in interpreting federal statutes or 
federal torts, for example. First, there is no reason to believe that ei­
ther plaintiffs or defendants in ordinary civil litigation will suffer any 
lopsided interpretation of the law, unlike the fate suffered by criminal 
defendants.'7 Second, the stakes are much higher with criminal litiga­
tion - when lower courts get it wrong, an individual may be wrong­
fully imprisoned. It is, of course, for this reason that the federal consti­
tution provides such extraordinary procedural protections in criminal 
cases, from the "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard of proof18 to 
free counsel for indigent defendants. 19 
My conceptual framework for the creation of incidental rights will 
likewise be based upon practicality. Scholars have already well ex­
plained a court imposing a remedy, a close cousin to an incidental 
right, despite the fact that such remedy will not always precisely re­
store the aggrieved party to his rightful position as determined by sub-
16. But see Lawrence Gene Sager, Fair Measure: The Legal Status of Underenforced 
Constitutional Norms, 91 HARV. L. REY. 1212, 1219-20 (1978) (suggesting that structural 
constitutional values are wisely underenforced by the judiciary but should be regarded as 
legally valid to their conceptual limits by the other branches, but excluding criminal proce­
dural guarantees). 
17. See infra note 135. 
18. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970). 
19. See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963). 
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stantive law, but will instead provide a little more or a little less.20 
Though one might argue that what I call "incidental rights" are more 
appropriate called constitutional remedies,21 my insistence on new 
terminology acknowledges Court precedent that is unlikely to change. 
The paradigmatic incidental right is the exclusionary sanction for a 
violation of the Fourth Amendment. The Court has quite definitively 
stated that exclusion is not a personal remedy to which a defendant is 
entitled.22 Moreover, using the term "incidental right" offers more 
flexibility than the term "remedy." That latter term implies an enti­
tlement to complete restoration of the status quo. The former term 
strives to uphold the particular clause at issue, and thus permits the 
Court, Congress, a state legislature, a state judge, or even a law en­
forcement agency to experiment with different procedures for up­
holding that clause, which may or may not provide a remedy to the 
aggrieved party. 
A. Constitutional Prophylactic Rules 
Constitutional criminal procedure is rife with prophylactic rules, 
which most often take the form of rebuttable or conclusive evidentiary 
presumptions or bright-line rules for law enforcement officials to fol­
low. The Court finds the former necessary in cases where factfinding 
would be particularly difficult, the latter necessary to guide officials 
making snap judgment without legal training, and both justified by the 
reality that the Court has limited time to hear individual cases. To my 
knowledge, no one has combed through constitutional criminal proce­
dural decisions to identify these rules. A nonexhaustive list of cases 
involving what I would term prophylactic rules follows, ordered by 
constitutional clause. 
The automobile inventory search exception to the Fourth 
Amendment's per se warrant requirement contains a prophylactic 
rule. The exception was created to protect the vehicle and the property 
20. See, e.g., DOUGLAS LAYCOCK, MODERN AMERICAN REMEDIES 272-76 (2d ed. 
1994); David S. Schoenbrod, The Measure of an Injunction: A Principle to Replace Balancing 
the Equities and Tailoring the Remedy, 72 MINN. L. REV. 672 (1988). Professor Meltzer justi­
fies what he calls "deterrent remedies" on the ground that the Court's "authority to declare 
the scope and implications of rights, and its obligation to address claims for relief presented 
by the parties - give it a distinctive claim to participate in the fashioning of deterrent reme­
dies." Daniel J. Meltzer, Deterring Constitutional Violations by Law Enforcement Officials: 
Plaintiffs and Defendants as Private A ttorneys General, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 247, 287 (1988); 
see also Daryl J. Levinson, Rights Essentialism and Remedial Equilibration, 99 COLUM. L. 
REV. 857 (1999) (criticizing the failure of "rights essentialists" such as Professors Monaghan 
and Sager to see that "remedial equilibration" more accurately describes constitutional in­
terpretation). 
21. My colleague Douglas Laycock insists that what I call "incidental rights" are just 
remedies, and that it would be clearer to say so. 
22. See infra notes 83-84 and accompanying text. 
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in it, to safeguard the police or other officers from claims of lost pos­
sessions, and to protect the police from potential danger.23 The pro­
phylactic rule declares "unreasonable" any inventory search that is not 
carried out in accordance with standard procedures in the local police 
department.24 The purpose of the procedure requirement is to ferret 
out pretextual searches; limiting officer discretion by forcing them to 
follow procedures reduces the chance that an officer will use the in­
ventory search exception to circumvent the requirements of probable 
cause and a judicial warrant. The rule is overprotective because it will 
exclude evidence obtained during an inventory search done at a sta­
tion without standardized procedures for such searches, even if the 
search was "reasonable" because it was conducted solely to protect 
the police against false claims.25 
The per se warrant requirement itself can be viewed as a prophy­
lactic rule designed to ensure that searches are reasonable. Though 
Justice Stewart famously said that searches conducted without a judi­
cial warrant are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment,26 
in light of the numerous "exceptions" crafted since 1948,27 it is difficult 
to argue with a straight face that this remains true today. In fact, the 
vast majority of searches are now conducted without a warrant, yet 
they are regularly declared "reasonable" by the Court.28 The per se 
warrant requirement has thus evolved into a presumption that a 
23. See South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364 (1976). 
24. See Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367 (1987); see also Florida v. Wells, 495 U.S. 1 
(1990). 
25. The Court crafted the same exception, along with the same prophylactic rule, in the 
case of inventory searches of persons arrested. See Illinois v. LaFayette, 462 U.S. 640 (1983). 
26. See Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10 (1948). For a review of the debate among 
Justices and scholars regarding the relationship between the warrant and the reasonableness 
clauses of the Fourth Amendment, see Susan R. Klein, Enduring Principles and Current 
Crises in Constillltional Criminal Procedure, 24 LAW & Soc. INQUIRY 533, 538-50 (1999). 
27. The exceptions include consent, Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973); 
plain view, Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971); the automobile exception, 
Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970); search incident to an arrest, Chime! v. California, 
395 U.S. 752 (1969); inventory of automobiles, South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364 
(1976); exigent circumstances, Vale v. Louisiana, 399 U.S. 30 (1 970); immigration road­
blocks, United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976); sobriety checkpoints, 
Michigan Dep't of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444 (1990); closely regulated business inspec­
tions, New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691 (1987); special needs searches, O'Connor v. Ortega, 
480 U.S. 709 (1987); and searches at the international border, United States v. Ramsey, 431 
U.S. 606 (1978). 
28. See, e.g., Richard Van Duizend et al., The Search Warrant Process: Preconceptions, 
Perceptions, and Practices, NAT'L CTR. FOR ST. CT. REPS. (1984) (offering anecdotal evi­
dence by one police detective who estimated the figure as high as 98 percent); MARC L. 
MILLER & RONALD F. WRIGHT, CRIMINAL PROCEDURES - THE POLICE 176 (1999) (stat­
ing that it "is difficult to determine what proportion of searches are carried out based on 
warrant, but the current appellate case law suggests a great majority of searches in most con­
texts are conducted without first obtaining a warrant"). 
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search conduct without a warrant is unreasonable - a presumption 
that can be rebutted by the prosecutor in any particular case. 
Turning to the Fifth Amendment's Self-Incrimination Clause, the 
obvious place to begin is the Miranda decision itself.29 As I discussed 
previously, the warnings themselves do not embody the rule or value 
contained in the privilege, unless one makes the outlandish claim that 
every statement made in response to police questioning while a person 
is in custody is compelled. It is likely that many suspects already know 
their rights and give voluntary statements because they think they can 
outsmart the police, or their conscience gets the best of them - the 
same reasons the great majority of suspects sign a waiver and make 
statements even after the Miranda warnings are given.30 The warnings 
are purely instrumental; their utility lies solely in how well they pro­
tect the privilege by preventing compulsion and assisting the Court in 
adjudicating these claims. 
Miranda's prophylactic rule was extended in Edwards v. Arizona31 
and Arizona v. Roberson32 to prohibit the introduction in a prosecu­
tor's case-in-chief of any statements taken by officers who reap­
proached a suspect for questioning after that suspect invoked her 
Miranda right to counsel. This rule is prophylactic because there is 
nothing valuable about prohibiting officers from questioning suspects, 
and the rule may well exclude statements given voluntarily, and thus 
not taken in violation of the explicit Fifth Amendment's privilege 
against self-incrimination.33 The Court extended this conclusive pre­
sumption of compulsion yet again in Minnick v. Mississippi,34 when it 
held that once a defendant invoked his Edwards right to an attorney 
he cannot be reapproached for an interview unless that attorney is 
physically present, even though the suspect consulted with his attorney 
after the invocation of rights but before the reapproach. This rule does 
not embody the Fifth Amendment's prohibition against compelled 
self-incrimination. Certainly there will be statements made in violation 
of the Minnick rule where the defendant's will is not overborne - for 
example, there may be cases where he simply changed his mind. De­
spite its failing in particular cases, however, the rule instrumentally 
29. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
30. See infra note 207. 
31 .  451 U.S. 477 (1981). 
32. 486 U.S. 675 (1988). 
33. For example, in Arizona v. Roberson, id. , a defendant had been arrested and 
Mirandized for burglary and invoked his right to an attorney. Three days later a different 
officer approached Roberson regarding a different burglary, Mirandized him, and obtained a 
statement. There was no intentional misconduct by the officers, as the second officer was 
unaware of the first officer's interrogation, and nothing suggested that Mr. Roberson's will 
was overborne. 
34. 498 U.S. 146 (1990). 
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advances Fifth Amendment values because, in most cases, it will be 
difficult for the Court to determine after the fact whether persistent 
attempts by official to persuade a defendant to waive his right resulted 
in compulsion. 
The Fifth Amendment's Double Jeopardy Clause is also protected 
by a prophylactic rule, at least in the multiple-punishment-in-a-single­
trial scenario. In Missouri v. Hunter,35 the Court held that where two 
criminal statutes proscribe the same offense under the Blockburger 
test, they are construed not to authorize cumulative punishments in 
the absence of clearly expressed legislative intent to the contrary.36 
The rule is a prophylactic one because it does not precisely track the 
underlying purpose of the Double Jeopardy Clause in a single trial 
situation - preventing the sentencing court from prescribing greater 
punishment than the legislature intended. Rather, it is instrumental, it 
is a method by which we divine legislative intent and ensure that the 
Clause is not violated. There will certainly be instances, however, 
where the legislature intended cumulative punishments but did not 
speak clearly enough for the Court,37 resulting in the vacation of a 
punishment that the Constitution permits. 
Moving to the Sixth Amendment, the Miranda Court also gave us 
United States v. Wade,38 requiring the exclusion of an in-courtroom 
identification of an accused when the accused participated in a post­
indictment lineup without counsel.39 This rule is a prophylactic one be­
cause the Court admits that not every post-indictment lineup in the 
absence of counsel is suggestive and thus violative of the Sixth 
Amendment and Due Process Clause if evidence of an identification 
during such a lineup is admitted.40 Rather, the rule is a preventive one; 
35. 459 U.S. 359 (1983). The Court framed this as a rule of statutory construction to pro­
tect the Double Jeopardy Clause's prohibition of more punishment in a single proceeding 
than authorized by the legislature. 
36. See also Albernaz v. United States, 450 U.S. 333 (1981) (noting that cumulative 
punishments can presumptively be assessed after a conviction for two offenses that are not 
the same under Blockburger.) 
37. In this setting, the prophylactic rule acts like a clear statement rule in statutory in­
terpretation. See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Quasi-Constitutional 
Law: Clear Statement Rules as Constitutional Lawmaking, 45 VAND. L. REV. 593, 611-28 
(1992) (detailing the Court's use of "super-strong clear statement rules" to protect constitu­
tional structures). 
38. 388 U.S. 218 (1967). 
39. As with the exclusion of evidence taken in violation of the Fourth Amendment, the 
judge will admit an in-court identification even after a post-indictment lineup in the absence 
of counsel if the government establishes by clear and convincing evidence that the in-court 
identification was not an exploitation of the illegality but rather was based upon observation 
of the suspect outside of the lineup. See id. at 240-41 .  
40. Professor Grano argued that Wade's right to  counsel requirement i s  not a prophylac­
tic rule, but "is rooted squarely in the sixth amendment's right to counsel provision." Grano, 
Prophylactic Rules, supra note 7, at 120-21 .  This flatly contradicts the language in the Court 
opinion itself. See infra text accompanying note 1 10 (quoting Wade, 388 U.S. at 239). 
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the pre-trial lineup "may not be capable of reconstruction at trial. "41 
There is no inherent value in having counsel at the lineup, nor does 
the text of the Sixth Amendment require it. Its only value is instru­
mental; counsel can "avert prejudice and assure a meaningful confron­
tation at trial. "42 
The Sixth Amendment's Confrontation Clause is protected by a 
prophylactic rule in the form of a conclusive presumption. In Bruton v. 
United States,43 the Court reversed its holding in Delli Paoli v. United 
States44 that the admission of a codefendant in a joint trial did not vio­
late the Confrontation Clause so long as the jury was cautioned that 
the confession was admissible only against the confessing party. There 
is certainly no value in excluding voluntary reliable confessions, nor in 
the increased cost and burdens on the state in severing trials. Moreo­
ver, the Bruton rule will require reversing convictions where the jury 
was able or would have been able to heed the cautionary instruction, 
and the striking of state procedures that are not, in all instances, un­
constitutional.45 The Court treated Bruton as a prophylactic rule in 
Richardson v. Marsh,46 when it refused to extend Bruton to the admis­
sion of a nontestifying codefendant's confession not directly linked to 
the defendant because it would impair "both the efficiency and the 
fairness of the criminal justice system."47 As the Richardson dissenters 
noted, concerns about costs would not ordinarily offset a constitu­
tional command.48 
Another Sixth Amendment example can be found in Cuyler v. 
Sullivan49 where the Court held that it will conclusively presume in­
competency of counsel in violation of the Sixth Amendment whenever 
there is an actual conflict of interest due to multiple representation 
adversely affecting an attorney's performance. Such a presumption 
grants additional protection to a defendant, who is ordinarily required 
to show that the deficient performance of his counsel prejudiced his 
defense.50 The Cuyler rule is a prophylactic one because it does not 
41. Wade, 388 U.S. at 236. 
42. Id. 
43. 391 U.S. 123 (1968). 
44. 352 U.S. 232 (1957). 
45. See Cruz v. New York, 481 U.S. 186, 196 n.2 (1987) (White, J., dissenting) (describ-
ing Bruton as "prophylactic in nature"). 
46. 481 U.S. 200 (1987). 
47. Id. at 210. 
48. Id. at 217-20 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
49. 446 U.S. 335 (1980). 
50. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) (holding that a criminal judge­
ment will not be reversed due to ineffective counsel unless the defendant establishes that his 
counsel's performance was deficient, and that there was a reasonable probability that, but 
for counsel's errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different). 
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embody the text of the constitutional clause at issue, in that the defen­
dant had "the assistance of counsel".51 Nor does the rule embody the 
value underlying the Sixth Amendment, as counsel may have been 
competent, the trial may have been a fair one, and the defendant may 
well have been convicted despite the multiple representation. Simi­
larly, the Court grants automatic reversal of a conviction when the 
trial court failed to inquire about an apparent conflict, again without 
requiring that the defendant establish prejudice.52 Finally, the Court 
presumes prejudice where there is actual or constructive denial of the 
assistance of counsel altogether,53 or state interference with counsel's 
assistance.54 The reasons the Court provides for selectively over­
protecting the Sixth Amendment fit nicely into my conceptual frame­
work for prophylactic rules: "Prejudice in these circumstances is so 
likely that case-by-case inquiry into prejudice is not worth the cost. 
Moreover, such circumstances involve impairments of the Sixth 
Amendment right that are easy to identify and, for that reason and be­
cause the prosecution is directly responsible, easy for the government 
to prevent."55 
The Rehnquist Court most recently accepted a prophylactic rule 
last term in Smith v. Robbins.56 In the 1967 case Anders v. California,57 
the Court held that the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses re­
quired some procedure to protect an indigent defendant's constitu­
tional right to appellate counsel. Finding the California procedure in 
Anders unacceptable, the Court sketched its own procedure: the de­
fendant's counsel must advise the Court that the appeal is "wholly 
frivolous," "request permission to withdraw," and file a brief referring 
51.  U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
52. See Sullivan, 446 U.S. at 347 (mandating reversal when the trial court has failed to 
make an inquiry even though it "knows or reasonably should know that a particular conflict 
exists"). The Court went further in Wood v. Georgia, 450 U.S. 261 (1981), where it held.that 
the possibility of a conflict of interest at defendant's parole revocation hearing imposes on 
the trial judge a duty to inquire further, and the breach of that duty mandates automatic re­
versal of parole revocation. 
53. See, e.g. , Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 82 (1988) (striking procedure that allowed 
counsel to withdraw before the court had determined whether counsel's evaluation of the 
case on appeal was accurate). Professor Schulhofer argued that the Sixth Amendment right 
of an indigent defendant to court appointed counsel is itself a kind of prophylactic rule de­
signed to protect the constitutional value of a fair hearing. The Court conclusively presumes 
the need for counsel to avoid the necessity of considering such factors as defendant's matur­
ity, background, and education. See Stephen J. Schulhofer, Reconsidering Miranda, 54 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 435 (1987). 
54. See, e.g., Perry v. Leeke, 488 U.S. 272 (1989) (conclusively presuming the prejudice 
component of an ineffective assistance of counsel claim where a judicial order precluded a 
testifying defendant's overnight consultation with his counsel). 
55. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 692. 
56. 120 S. Ct. 746 (2000). 
57. 386 U.S. 738 (1967). 
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to anything in the record that might arguably support the appeal.58 The 
Robbins Court held that "[t]he procedure we sketched in Anders is a 
prophylactic one; the States are free to adopt different procedures, so 
long as those procedures adequately safeguard a defendant's right to 
appellate counsel."59 These rules are prophylactic because the proce­
dures are not required by the text of the constitutional clauses at issue, 
nor are they inherently valuable, nor do they embody the values un­
derlying the constitutional clause they are designed to protect. The 
value underlying this application of the Due Process and Equal 
Protection Clauses is that an indigent defendant receive approxi­
mately the same justice as a rich one.60 Any procedures that ade­
quately assure the Court of this are acceptable, and many different 
procedures will surely suffice. ' 
In Batson v. Kentucky,61 the Court created a prophylactic rule to 
protect a defendant's Fourteenth Amendment right to equal protec­
tion by holding that a defendant can establish a prima facie case of 
purposeful discrimination in the selection of the petit jury based solely 
on evidence concerning the prosecutor's exercise of peremptory chal­
lenges against potential jurors of the same race as the defendant, 
shifting to the State the burden of coming forward with a neutral ex­
planation for its challenges. This rule is prophylactic because it does 
not directly embody the value of the Equal Protection Claus·e, which 
protects against intentional discrimination. It is simply one method of 
determining discrimination, a method that may well result in reversals 
of convictions where the prosecutor did not intentionally discriminate 
in her use of peremptory challenges, but was simply unable to marshal 
the evidence to rebut the defendant's prima facie case. 
To safeguard against judicial vindictiveness in violation of the 
Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause, the Court in North 
Carolina v. Pearce62 established a rule requiring that a sentencing 
judge who imposes a more severe sentence upon a defendant after a 
new trial affirmatively state his reasons on the record, and those rea­
sons must be based upon information concerning identifiable conduct 
on the part of the defendant occurring after the time of the original 
sentencing proceeding. The rule is prophylactic because there is no 
58. Id. at 744. 
59. Robbins, 120 S. Ct. at 753 (California procedures allow counsel to remain silent on 
the merits of the case and offer to brief issues at the court's direction). See also Penson v. 
Ohio, 488 U.S. 75 (1988) (stating that Anders erects safeguards); Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 
U.S. 551 (1987) (noting that the Anders procedures do not constitute an independent consti­
tutional command, but rather a prophylactic framework). 
60. See, e.g., McCoy v. Court of Appeals of Wis., Dist. 1, 486 U.S. 429 (1988) (an indi­
gent must receive "substantial equality" compared to the legal assistance that a defendant 
with paid counsel would receive). 
61 . 476 U.S. 79 (1986). 
62. 395 U.S. 711  (1969). 
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constitutional bar to the imposition of a more severe sentence upon 
retrial, only one imposed "vindictively" (because the defendant exer­
cised his right to appeal). The Pearce rule, like any presumption, will 
invariably require the reversal and vacation of a sentence that was not 
imposed vindictively, but where the presumption was inadequately re­
butted by the judge.63 The prophylactic rule the Court imposed to pro­
tect against vindictive judges in Pearce was extended to vindictive 
prosecutors in Blackledge v. Perry.64 As with Pearce, the presumption 
in Blackledge may well result in dismissal of charges the filing of which 
would not violate due process, simply because the prosecutor failed to 
rebut the presumption in the defendant's favor. 
The Court in Jackson v. Denno65 struck down a New York proce­
dure allowing the same jury to determine the voluntariness of the con­
fession and the guilt of the defendant, despite a cautionary instruction 
to disregard the confession in its entirety if the jury finds it was co­
erced. This conclusive presumption is a prophylactic rule because 
there is nothing inherently valuable in having a judge or a different 
jury determine these two issues, nor is this rule dictated by the text of 
the Amendment. Certainly there is some jury up to the task of sepa­
rating its decisionmaking regarding the voluntariness of the confession 
from its decisionmaking regarding other evidence of the defendant's 
guilt, and in fact this might have happened in Jackson's case. Thus the 
Court reversed a state court conviction that might not have suffered a 
constitutional infirmity, and invalidated a state procedural rule that, at 
least in some instances, would not run afoul of the federal 
Cons ti tu ti on. 
B. Constitutional Safe Harbor Rules 
Safe harbor rules provide that when an officer properly follows a 
certain procedure, the Court will not entertain an argument from a 
criminal defendant that, on the facts of his particular case, the search 
was nonetheless unreasonable and violative of the Fourth 
Amendment. Such rules may be necessary to offer clear guidance to 
non-law trained officers, and to assist the Court in adjudicating claims. 
63. The Court has, on numerous occasions, acknowledged this possibility. See, e.g. , 
Michigan v. Payne, 412 U.S. 47, 53 (1973) ("It is an inherent attribute of prophylactic consti­
tutional rules, such as those established in Miranda and Pearce, that their respective applica­
tion will occasion windfall benefits for some defendants who have suffered no constitutional 
deprivation."). 
64. 417 U.S. 21 (1974) (establishing a rebuttable presumption for prosecutorial vindic­
tiveness when a prosecutor brings a more serious charge against a defendant seeking to ex­
ercise his statutory right to a trial de nova following his conviction on a lesser included mis­
demeanor.) 
65. 378 U.S. 368 (1964). 
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For example, the Court in Chime/ v. California66 held that an officer 
can conduct a warrantless search of an arrestee and his "grab area" 
consistent with the Fourth Amendment to protect that officer against 
the arrestee's reach for a weapon, and to prevent the destruction of 
physical evidence. The explicit constitutional rule is that a warrantless 
search incident to an arrest conducted for such purposes is "reason­
able" within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. Realizing that it 
could not adequately determine on a case-by-case basis when the offi­
cer had such a purpose, and that the case-by-case method of adjudica­
tion gave little guidance to police, the Court created a safe harbor rule 
that proof of a constitutionally valid arrest triggers a conclusive pre­
sumption that the search of the arrestee was "reasonable" under the 
Fourth Amendment. In United States v. Robinson,67 the Court ex­
tended this safe harbor rule to include containers found on an arrested 
defendant's person and, in New York v. Belton,68 it further extended 
the rule to the search of an entire passenger compartment of an ar­
rested defendant's car. In Robinson, the container searched, a ciga­
rette package in defendant's pocket, obviously contained neither a 
weapon nor evidence of his offense of driving after the revocation of 
his license. Likewise, in Belton, the officers were permitted to search a 
leather jacket found in the back seat of the automobile, clearly out of 
the reach of a defendant standing quite a distance from the automo­
bile. The safe harbor rule was extended once more in Maryland v. 
Buie to allow a protective sweep of rooms "adjoining the place of ar- . 
rest from which an attack could be immediately launched.69 The Court 
will not consider an argument by the defendant that the officers ar­
resting him for mail fraud knew full well that such an attack would not 
be forthcoming, and the officers were actually searching for his co­
caine stash without probable cause or a warrant. 
Though these safe harbor rules may permit searches without war­
rants that might be "unreasonable" on their particular facts, they ad­
vance the Court's ability to enforce the reasonableness requirement of 
the Fourth Amendment generally, because in many instances searches 
of containers and passenger compartments of automobiles incident to 
an arrest may reveal weapons and evidence of crime, and it is difficult 
for the Court to determine ex post whether each particular search was 
reasonable. This safe harbor rule also instrumentally advances the 
Fourth Amendment mandate that all searches be reasonable in that it 
66. 395 U.S. 752 (1969). 
67. 414 U.S. 218 (1973). 
68. 453 U.S. 454, 461 (1981) ("It is true, of course, that these containers will sometimes 
be such that could hold neither a weapon nor evidence of the criminal conduct for which the 
suspect was arrested."). Belton was identified as a "reverse prophylactic rule" by Professor 
Stephen J. Schulhofer, supra note 53, at 439. 
69. 494 U.S. 325, 334 (1990). 
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offers bright-line guidance for officers in the field, who might other­
wise get it wrong.70 
The Court made an identical move in expanding searches of auto­
mobiles pursuant to the automobile exception to the warrant require­
ment (regardless of whether the driver is arrested). The original justi­
fication for this exception was that cars are mobile, so there is no time 
to obtain a warrant;71 to this was added the justification that a driver 
has a decreased expectation of privacy in his automobile.72 In a series 
of cases in from 1977 to 1982, the Court held that where an officer had 
probable cause to believe that a particular container in an automobile 
contained contraband or evidence of a crime, these justifications did 
not apply and the officer must seize the container and obtain a war­
rant before searching.73 However, about a decade later in California v. 
Acevedo,74 the Court determined that officers and courts were "con­
fused" by the distinction between probable cause to search the car 
(permitting a warrantless search of the entire car, including closed 
containers) and probable cause to search a container located in a car 
(permitting a warrantless seizure but not a search), and thus created a 
safe harbor rule that permits officers to conduct a warrantless search 
in either case. 
The Court has been rightly hesitant in accepting proposed safe 
harbors. In Richards v. Wisconsin,75 the Court rejected Wisconsin's 
proposed "blanket rule" excusing the otherwise applicable Fourth 
Amendment "knock and announce" requirement when the search 
warrant concerned a felony drug offense. Last term, in Illinois v. 
Wardlow,76 the Court rejected the government's proposed safe harbor 
rule that "reasonable suspicion" to justify a Terry detention is always 
established by flight from a known police officer in a high-crime area. 
In each of these cases, the Court determined that the proposed rule 
70. See Belton, 453 U.S. at 458 ("In short, [a) single, familiar standard is essential to 
guide police officers, who have only limited time and expertise to reflect on and balance the 
social and individual interests involved in the specific circumstances they confront."). 
71. See Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970). 
72. See California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386 (1985). This was a strange case to select for 
this expansion, as Mr. Carney lived in his motor home, and therefore had a greater expecta­
tion of privacy than any of the defendants in the earlier automobile exception cases. 
73. Compare United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1 (1977) (noting that, where officers 
have probable cause to believe a double-locked footlocker in the open trunk of a parked car 
contains a controlled substance, they cannot search without warrant), and Arkansas v. 
Sanders, 442 U.S. 759 (1979) (noting that, where officers have probable cause to believe that 
a suitcase in the closed trunk of a moving cab contains marijuana, they cannot search with­
out a warrant), with United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798 (1982) (noting that, where officers 
have probable cause to believe that a vehicle contains a controlled substance, they may 
search the entire vehicle, including containers, without a warrant). 
74. 500 U.S. 565 (1991). 
75. 520 U.S. 385 (1997). 
76. 528 U.S. 119 (2000). 
March 2001) Prophylactic Rules 1047 
would vastly underprotect the Fourth Amendment. It is simply not 
true, as an empirical matter, that most searches for controlled sub­
stances carry a risk of physical harm to the police or destruction of 
evidence (the justification for case-specific exceptions to the Fourth 
Amendment's knock and announce rule ),77 nor is it true that in most 
instances flight from an identified officer alone indicates that there is 
criminal activity afoot (the Fourth Amendment justification for a brief 
warrantless detention).78 Thus, the burden of proof remained with the 
government to establish a safety risk in Richards, and to articulate its 
reasons under the totality of the circumstances test for suspecting Mr. 
Wardlow of criminal activity. In fact, the Court did entertain the ar­
gument from those defendants that the government action was unrea­
sonable in those particular cases. 
C. Constitutional Incidental Rights 
As with prophylactic rules, no scholar has, to my knowledge, ana­
lyzed the constitutional criminal procedural doctrines to identify rights 
which are not themselves mandated by the constitutional clause the 
right is designed to further. A nonexclusive list of what I call incidental 
rights follows. 
Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of 
Narcotics19 is the first example of what I call an incidental right, at 
least as the Court has subsequently interpreted that case. The Fourth 
Amendment's prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures 
was allegedly violated in Bivens by federal agents effecting a residen­
tial arrest and search without a warrant, and employing excessive 
force. A constitutional incidental right, however, unlike a prophylactic 
rule, does not seek to prevent the particular constitutional violation at 
issue (quite impossible, since the violation already occurred). Rather, 
it seeks to provide a personal remedy to the particular plaintiff, deter 
future violations, or assist the Court in adjudicating or upholding con­
stitutional rights. Nothing about the Fourth Amendment or the 
Constitution in general mandates a money judgment as compensation 
for a Fourth Amendment violation, or, perhaps, any remedy at all. Be-
77. Richards, 520 U.S. at 392-93 (noting that the "blanket exception" proposed by the 
government "contains considerable overgeneralization"). 
78. The majority opinion did not take a stand on the empirical question, simply noting 
that state courts disagree on whether unprovoked flight is sufficient grounds to constitute 
reasonable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot. Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 123 n . 1 .  The four 
dissenters, agreeing that the Court should refrain from adopting a per se rule that unpro­
voked flight by itself always or never constitutes reasonable suspicion, cited existing empiri­
cal data indicating that minorities and those residing in high crime areas may flee even if in­
nocent because "contact with the police can itself be dangerous." Id. at 132 (Stevens, J. ,  
dissenting). 
79. 403 U.S. 388 (1971). 
1048 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 99:1030 
cause Congress had not provided a remedy, the Bivens Court believed 
it was necessary for it to step in, at least until Congress offered an al­
ternative. I contend that Bivens actions for federal violations of consti­
tutional rights are incidental rights rather than pure constitutional in­
terpretation for two reasons. First, a damage action is not the only or 
an indispensable method for protecting the underlying guarantee; 
many other options, such as exclusion of the evidence or injunctive re­
lief, are possible. Second, though it appeared that Bivens actions might 
be constitutionally mandated in 1971, and though many noted scholars 
argued that the Constitution demands some remedy,8() it is inaccurate 
at this time to say that Bivens actions are constitutionally required. As 
Harlan's concurrence in Bivens and later Court cases make clear, the 
Court is divining congressional intent rather than interpreting the fed­
eral Constitution, and therefore will not examine the adequacy of the 
congressional remedial scheme in the area affected by the alleged 
wrongdoing. 81 
The best-known example of what I define as an incidental right is 
the exclusionary sanction barring the admission of evidence obtained 
in violation of the Fourth Amendment. Though when it was first made 
binding on the states in Mapp v. Ohio82 this exclusionary sanction ap­
peared to be a constitutional requirement, this is no longer the case. 
Post-Mapp cases have made clear that the admission of evidence ob­
tained in violation of the Fourth Amendment is not itself a violation of 
the Fourth Amendment, since the injury to the privacy of the victim 
has already occurred and cannot be repaired.83 Rather, the exclusion­
ary sanction is a judicially created procedure designed to deter future 
Fourth Amendment violations.84 The exclusionary sanction does not 
80. See, e.g. , Walter E. Dellinger, Of Rights and Remedies: The Constitution as a Sword, 
85 HARV. L. REV. 1532 (1972). 
81. See, e.g., Bivens, 403 U.S. at 405 (Harlan, J., concurring) (noting that the federal 
common law in Bivens arose not directly from the Constitution, but rather from the combi­
nation of the Court's historical ability to provide a remedy for the violation of individual lib­
erties and an interpretation of 28 U.S.C. § 1331); see also Schweiker v. Chilicky, 487 U.S. 412 
(1988) (holding that Congress intended the Social Security Disability Benefits Reform Act 
of 1984 to be the exclusive remedy for due process violation of wrongful termination of dis­
ability benefits, though that act did not apply to plaintiffs); Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367 
(1983) (holding that there would be no damage remedy for federal civil servant's dismissal in 
retaliation for exercising First Amendment rights because of alternative Congressional re­
medial scheme). 
82. 367 U.S. 643 (1961). 
83. See, e.g., United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 354 (1974) (stating that the witness 
can be asked questions during a federal grand jury interrogation based on information re­
sulting from an unlawful search as use of the improperly seized material "work[s] no new 
Fourth Amendment wrong"). 
84. See, e.g., Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83 (1998); Pennsylvania Bd. of Prob. & 
Parole v. Scott, 524 U.S. 357 (1998) (noting that evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth 
Amendment could be used at a parole violation hearing because the deterrent effect of ap­
plying the exclusionary rule would not outweigh the cost); United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 
897 (1984). 
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embody either the text of or the values underlying the Fourth 
Amendment: it does not prohibit unreasonable search and seizures, 
and it does not protect the privacy of the person obtaining the benefit 
of the exclusion. Its purpose is purely instrumental - it is hoped that 
officers will have less incentive to violate other persons' Fourth 
Amendment rights in the future. Assuming some other remedy, such 
as monetary damages or citizen review boards would deter as effec­
tively, neither the Court nor the Constitution should prefer one over 
the other. 
The Court in Franks v. Delaware85 mandated a post-search hearing 
to determine whether an officer was deliberately or recklessly untruth­
ful in her warrant affidavit, with exclusion of evidence as the outcome. 
The Court rejected "the alternative sanctions of a perjury prosecution, 
administrative discipline, contempt, or a civil suit" as inadequate.86 
This was an incidental right created by the Court after balancing the 
time and cost of an extra proceeding against the detrimental effect on 
the Fourth Amendment of providing no effective remedy when offi­
cers establish probable cause by lying. 
Yet another incidental right triggered by a Fourth Amendment 
violation is the rule that evidence taken during a suppression motion 
cannot be used by the prosecutor in her case-in-chief in the subse­
quent criminal trial. Simmons v. United States87 straddles the line be­
tween a prophylactic rule and an incidental right. There may or may 
not be an actual Fourth Amendment violation, depending upon how 
the judge rules on the suppression motion. In either case, however, the 
Court has determined that allowing the government to use suppres­
sion hearing testimony against a defendant during the criminal trial 
puts him to an unfair choice between asserting his Fourth Amendment 
right against an unreasonable search and his Fifth Amendment privi­
lege against self-incrimination. 
The remedy for violation of a defendant's Sixth Amendment 
speedy trial guarantee should have been framed as an incidental right. 
In Barker v. Wingo,88 the Court instead held that the remedy of dis­
missal of the indictment is "the only possible remedy." It is difficult to 
understand why Justice Powell believed this to be true. The Court of 
Appeals in United States v. Strunk89 offered the novel rule of subtract­
ing the unjustified days of delay from the defendant's total sentence 
after conviction, rather than dismissing the charge. One can imagine 
85. 438 U.S. 154 (1978). 
86. Id. at 169. 
87. 390 U.S. 377 (1968). In this case, an alleged robber took the stand at the suppression 
hearing and admitted ownership of a suitcase with incriminating evidence inside in order to 
establish standing to contest the search. 
88. 407 U.S. 514 (1972). 
89. 467 F.2d at 969 (7th Cir. 1972), rev'd, 412 U.S. 434 (1973). 
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equally creative remedies, such as money damages; demotion of 
prosecutors involved in the case; or an instruction to the jury explain­
ing that the government unreasonably delayed the trial, that this may 
prejudice the defendant, and they may take this into account in ren­
dering their verdict. This case was also a perfect candidate for a consti­
tutional prophylactic rule. Though Justice Powell claimed that the 
Court does "not establish procedural rules for the States, except when 
mandated by the Constitution,"90 that, of course, is not true. This case 
would have given the Court the perfect opportunity to proffer a pro­
phylactic rule similar to the Federal Speedy Trial Act adopted by 
Congress two years later,91 or perhaps offer defendants some new ac­
tion for mandamus in federal court to require the prosecutor to move 
forward in a timely manner. 
The Court in Vasquez v. Hillery92 provided for the reversal of the 
criminal conviction of a defendant clearly guilty of a brutal murder be­
cause African Americans were systematically excluded from the grand 
jury that indicted him. In fashioning the incidental right of reversal, 
rather than upholding the conviction on the basis of harmless error re­
view or a finding that systemic racial discrimination no longer infects 
the selection of grand juries in Kings County, the Court weighed the 
impossibility of retrying the defendant for a twenty-three-year-old of­
fense against the seriousness of the constitutional violation and the de­
sire to prevent racial discrimination in the future. The Court did con­
sider alternative incidental rights, such as criminal prosecutions of 
those officials that engaged in the discrimination, or a civil rights ac­
tion by blacks excluded from jury service against the discriminating of­
ficials, but found them inadequate to the task.93 
Finally, the dismissal of an indictment94 or reversal of a conviction95 
in response to a successful claim that the Equal Protection Clause was 
violated by selective prosecution of a defendant because of his race, 
90. Barker, 407 U.S. at 523. 
91. Federal Speedy Trial Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-619, 88 Stat. 2076 (1975) (codified 
at 18 U.S.C. §§ 3161 -74, 3152-56 (1994)). See infra note 1 17 and accompanying text. 
92. 474 U.S. 254 (1986). 
93. See id. at 262 n.5. 
94. The Court has "never determined whether dismissal of the indictment, or some 
other sanction, is the proper remedy if a court determines that a defendant has been the vic­
tim of prosecution on the basis of his race." United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 461 
n.2 (1996) (refusing to allow discovery on selective enforcement of crack cocaine law as de­
fendant failed to show similarly situated white crack users who were not prosecuted); see 
also Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598 (1985) (refusing to dismiss indictment on selective 
prosecutions grounds as defendant failed to show the government selected non-registrants 
for prosecution on the basis of their speech). 
95. See Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886) (reversing a conviction for violation of 
ordinance prohibiting the construction of wooden laundries without a license because of dis­
criminatory denial of licenses to individuals of Chinese origin). 
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religion, ethnicity, or viewpoint is an incidental right. There is cer­
tainly nothing inherently valuable in dismissing the indictments of ad­
mitted drug dealers. The Court, however, demanded that some action 
be taken, though it has not opined that the Constitution demands a 
particular response. Perhaps a civil action for money damages, the 
demotion or firing of the police officers or prosecutors involved, or a 
requirement that the government prosecute similarly situated indi­
viduals of other races would do as nicely. 
II. (RE)FORMULATING PROPHYLACTIC RULES, SAFE HARBORS, 
AND INCIDENTAL RIGHTS 
There is simply no returning to the pre-prophylactic rules and inci­
dental rights days, both because the Court will not return,96 and be­
cause, as a normative matter, the Court should not. The charge that 
prophylactic rules and incidental rights are constitutionally illegiti­
mate, because the Court has no authority to provide greater protec­
tion than mandated by the federal Constitution, seems to me merely a 
policy preference in favor of under-enforcement rather than over­
enforcement of individual liberties. Those making this argument 
against prophylactic rules and incidental rights are resoundingly quiet 
about safe harbor rules, which underenforce individual liberties. 
Those rules, however, are subject to a similar criticism: it is constitu­
tionally illegitimate for the Court to ignore a State's violation of the 
federal Constitution in a case before it. Moreover, the Court is an in­
stitution that must craft rules and procedures allowing it to effectively 
decide the cases before it. Finally, as I demonstrate below, there are 
great advantages to utilizing prophylactic rules and incidental rights 
over the alternative of core constitutional interpretation if the Court 
moves carefully enough. A constitutional rule cannot be easily 
changed by subsequent legislation, but a prophylactic rule or inciden­
tal right can be.97 Moreover, a prophylactic rules can be used as a 
technique for the Court to indicate its level of certainty regarding the 
propriety of a procedure. The critical question today is how the Court 
can best utilize these prophylactic rules, safe harbor rules, and rights in 
a way that maximizes their benefits and minimizes their dangers. 
96. Only Justices Scalia and Thomas might be willing to reverse the great quantity of 
case law needed to return to those days. See Dickerson v. United States, 120 S. Ct. 2326 
(2000) (Scalia and Thomas, JJ., dissenting). 
97. There may be the rare case where the Court will gradually accept a constitutional 
change triggered by legislation. It seems to me, however, that there is certainly quite a dif­
ferent psychological advantage in a legislature requesting that the Court modify a prophylac­
tic rule rather than a constitutional interpretation. 
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A. Fostering a Dialogue Between the Supreme Court 
and Other Federal and State Actors 
The primary critique of prophylactic rules one sees in the litera­
ture, in addition to the Article III legitimacy critique, is that such rules 
implicate federalism and national separation of powers.98 The concern 
is that the Court might wield this rulemaking authority to intrude un­
necessarily upon criminal law, an area traditionally left to state 
authority,99 beyond what pure constitutional interpretation would 
countenance. Additionally, in attempting to deter executive branch of­
ficials from violating the Constitution, and in drafting many criminal 
procedure rules and rights that arguably should be drafted by 
Congress, prophylactic rulemaking intrudes upon the separation of 
powers in the national government. I do not believe the answer to the 
federalism criticism is any need for national uniformity in criminal 
procedures, 100 nor do I believe that the complete answer to the separa­
tion of powers argument is that vindication of constitutional rights is a 
traditional function of judicial review. 101 The more persuasive answer 
is that nature abhors a vacuum. When the Court promulgates such 
rules and rights it is not attempting to fashion uniform national rules, 
nor is it jealously guarding its judicial prerogative to remedy constitu­
tional wrongs. Rather, it has stepped in by necessity - when states re­
fuse to act to protect the constitutional criminal procedural guarantees 
in state criminal trials, 102 and when Congress and the Attorney 
General fail to protect the constitutional criminal procedural guaran­
tees of federal defendants. 
The paradigmatic examples of the Court creating an incidental 
right and prophylactic rule because of state government failure are the 
Mapp and Miranda cases, respectively. The Supreme Court had no 
choice but to extend the exclusionary rule for violations of the Fourth 
Amendment to the states in 1961 because of the continued lawlessness 
the country experienced during the twelve years between Wolf v. 
Colorado,'°3 where the Court held that the federal exclusionary rem­
edy did not apply to the states, and Mapp v. Ohio,104 where the Court 
98. See Schrock & Welsh, supra note 7. 
99. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 564 (1995) (striking the Gun Free School 
Zone Act of 1990 as beyond Congress's power pursuant to the Commerce Clause, in part 
because criminal law enforcement is an area "where states historically have been sover­
eign"). 
100. This was Professor Monaghan's response. Monaghan, supra note 5, at 18. 
101. Monaghan argued this as well. Monaghan, supra note 5, at 34. 
102. See, e.g. , William J. Brennan, Jr., The Bill of Rights and the States, 36 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 761 (1961) (arguing for selective incorporation). 
103. 338 U.S. 25 (1949). 
104. 367 U.S. 643 (196 1). 
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held that it did. The Court had given the states every opportunity to 
act, yet state legislatures between the time of Wolf and Mapp provided 
no remedies for Fourth Amendment violations, state judges and police 
departments implemented no procedures to deter violations, and state 
law enforcement officials never bothered to learn, much less obey, the 
search and seizure rules imposed by the federal Constitution.105 
The same is true for extending warnings regarding the Self­
Incrimination Clause to the states. While federal law enforcement 
agencies were routinely warning defendants of their Fifth Amendment 
privilege against self-incrimination,106 state police departments were 
not only failing to warn but were frequently engaging in excessively 
coercive interrogation techniques. 101 
Placing this blame on state actors and other branches of the na­
tional government is only part of the answer. The Court was also 
forced to develop prophylactic rules in light of its own institutional 
limitations. The Court could not hear a sufficient number of state con­
fession cases to protect the Self-Incrimination Clause, and the Court 
could not persuade state actors to learn much less follow its interpreta­
tion of the Fourth Amendment. If the Court is unable to do its job 
without prophylactic rules and incidental rights, it must rely on police 
departments and legislatures to enact such rules, or it must fashion 
them itself. When the Court generates safe harbors, it is acting from 
this sort of necessity. The problem is not the state and federal officials 
fail to act after a signal that the Court is unable to protect the particu­
lar constitutional right at issue. Rather, the Court is responding to the 
fact that its own case law is too confusing for nonlawyer police to learn 
or follow, or the factual circumstances confronted by the state actors 
are too varied for a standard (rather than bright-line rule) to provide 
sufficient guidance. I will not include safe harbor rules as amenable to 
ready modification by the other branches. The creation or modifica­
tion of a safe harbor by legislative or executive actors should be 
viewed by the Court with some suspicion, as such rules by definition 
enlarge executive power at the expense of the Constitution. 
105. See, e.g., Donald Dripps, A khil Amar on Criminal Procedure and Constitutional 
Law: "Here I Go Down That Wrong Road Again,"  74 N.C. L. REV. 1559 (1996); Klein, supra 
note 26, at 549-50. 
106. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
107. Id.; see also Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503 (1963) (refusal to allow contact 
with family); Lynumn v. Illinois, 372 U.S. 528 (1963) (false representation that children 
would be removed from home); Reck v. Pate, 367 U.S. 433 (1961) (deprivation of food, wa­
ter, and sleep); Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315 (1959) (sympathy falsely aroused); Payne v. 
Arkansas, 356 U.S. 560 (1958) (threat of angry mob); Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143 
(1944) (thirty-six hours of nonstop incommunicado interrogation); Brown v. Mississippi, 297 
U.S. 278 (1936) (whipping of black suspect). As the Dickerson majority noted, the Court de­
cided thirty confession cases between Brown in 1941 and Escobedo in 1964. Dickerson v. 
United States, 120 S. Ct. 2326, 2330 (2000). This, of course, was just the tip of the iceberg. 
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While legislative and law-enforcement failure to act and the 
Court's own institutional limitations explain why the Court began cre­
ating prophylactic rules, safe harbors, and incidental rights, it does not, 
by itself, defeat the federalism and separation of powers criticisms. 
These criticisms are answered by the fact that prophylactic rules and 
incidental rights are fully open to revision by Congress, federal execu­
tive action, and state legislative, executive or judicial action.108 If one 
views the purposes behind federalism as the preservation of local con­
trol in fields traditionally left to state government and the reform and 
evolution of criminal procedures attained by experimentation, these 
values should not be lost, and in fact would be advanced. While the 
Court will, of course, have the final say as to whether alternative pro­
phylactic rules and rights provided by legislators, law enforcement 
agencies, and state judges sufficiently protect the Bill of Rights in a 
manner the Court can effectively oversee, the use of prophylactic rules 
and incidental rights rather than pure constitutional interpretation 
gives the states exactly that opportunity for diversity and experimenta­
tion. Further, it allows the other two branches of the federal govern­
ment increased opportunities for participation. 
There are a number of examples of the Court signaling to other 
state and federal actors that a certain constitutional prophylactic rule 
or constitutional incidental right was up for grabs. These have been 
met with varying degrees of success. During the same term as the 
Miranda decision, the Court in United States v. Wade109 instituted what 
I would define as a constitutional prophylactic rule and openly invited 
legislative or executive counteroffers. The Court noted that 
"[l]egislative or other regulations, such as those of local police de­
partments, which eliminate the risks of abuse and unintentional sug-
108. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997), will not stand in the way of congres­
sional and executive development of alternative procedures. The Court's invitation to these 
actors to assist in fashioning prophylactic rules and incidental rights telegraphs the Court's 
future decision as to whether the action would be congruent with, and proportional to, a 
constitutional violation. See id. at 520. Though the Court has left the boundaries unclear, 
prophylactic rules by Congress substituting for constitutional prophylactic rules developed 
by the Court should be acceptable, as " [l)egislation which deters or remedies constitutional 
violations can fall within the sweep of Congress' enforcement power even if in the process it 
prohibits conduct which is not itself unconstitutional." Id. at 518. 
Likewise, state attempts to fashion prophylactic rules and incidental rights should be 
constitutionally acceptable; first because the Court requested these attempts; second, be­
cause federalism demands that the states be granted at least as much leeway for experimen­
tation as the federal government; and third, as a reflection of a state constitution which may 
provide greater protection than the federal Constitution. See, e.g., State v. Gerschoffer, 738 
N.E.2d 713 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000) (noting that sobriety checkpoints permitted by the Fourth 
Amendment violate the Indiana Constitution); Michael C. Dorf & Barry Friedman, Shared 
Constitutional Interpretation, 2000 SUP. CT. REV. (forthcoming 2001) (arguing that City of 
Boerne will not prohibit either federal or state alternatives to Miranda); Leigh A. Morrissey, 
State Courts Reject Leon on State Constitutional Grounds: A Defense of Reactive Rulings, 47 
VAND. L. REV. 917 (1994). 
109. 388 U.S. 218 (1967). 
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gestion at lineup proceedings and the impediments to meaningful con­
frontation at trial may also remove the basis for regarding the stage as 
'critical.' "110 The resulting initial dialogue between the Court and 
Congress might be labeled a failure in light of the immediate congres­
sional attempt to overrule Wade without eliminating the potential for 
suggestive lineups,1 1 1  though the federal executive branch has stead­
fastly refused to utilize that statute. On the state and local levels, how­
ever, there were early attempts to institute substitute procedures,112  
some effectively removing the need for counsel during those lineups.1 13 
More recently, there is success at the federal level as well. Former 
Attorney General Janet Reno commissioned the Technical Working 
Group for Eyewitness Evidence to develop the 1999 guide for effec­
tive procedures for witness identifications.1 1 4  Though no federal court 
has yet opined as to whether these recommended procedures effec­
tively replace the need for counsel at lineups, at least one jurisdiction 
has already implemented them.1 15 
A successful example of the dialogue and cooperation I envision is 
Congress's reaction to Barker v. Wingo.116 Congress was understanda­
bly unhappy with the Court's selection of dismissal of an indictment 
against a quite possibly guilty defendant as a constitutional incidental 
right of the Sixth Amendment's speedy trial guarantee. Passage of the 
1 10. Id. at 239. 
1 1 1 .  As part of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 Congress en­
acted not only 18 U.S.C. § 3501, attempting to repeal Miranda, but also 18 U.S.C. § 3502, 
purporting to overrule Wade. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3501-02 (1994). This statute has, to my knowl­
edge, never been used by a federal prosecutor in an attempt to admit witness testimony iden­
tifying a defendant after a post-indictment lineup in the absence of counsel. 
1 12. See, e.g., Frank T. Read, Lawyers at Lineups: Constitutional Necessity or A voidable 
Extravagance?, 17 UCLA L. REV. 339 (1969) (discussing regulations for New York City, 
Oakland, California, Washington D.C, and Clark County, Nevada published as appendices); 
Note, Protection of the Accused at Police Lineups, 6 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROBS. 345 (1970) 
(discussing regulations in Los Angeles, New Orleans, and Richmond, Virginia). 
1 13. See, e.g., People v. Fowler, 461 P.2d 643 (Cal. 1969) (holding that detailed regula­
tions for the conducting of lineups, including that two still photographs be taken of the line, 
were sufficient); People v. Curtis, 497 N.E.2d 1004 (111. 1986) (holding that there is no right 
to counsel if lineup photographed); Bruce v. State, 375 N.E.2d 1042 (Ind. 1978) (holding that 
there is no Sixth Amendment basis for exclusion where lineup was photographed and de­
fense counsel had the opportunity to cross-examine the officer who created the lineup). But 
see United States v. LaPierre, 998 F.2d 1460 (9th Cir. 1993) (holding that videotape was in­
sufficient as it only showed the lineup members and did not record what occurred in the wit­
ness room). 
1 14. See U.S. Dep't of Just., Eyewitness Evidence: A Guide for Law Enforcement, NAT'L 
INST. JUST. (Oct. 1999) [hereinafter Eyewitness Evidence]. 
115.  The State of New Jersey has done so, according to Deputy Attorney General Lori 
Linskey. Telephone interview with Lori Linskey, Deputy Attorney General for the State of 
New Jersey (Mar. 1, 2001). 
1 16. 407 U.S. 514 (1972). 
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Federal Speedy Trial Act117 immediately after and in response to 
Barker offered the perfect prophylactic rule to prevent the application 
of the constitutional incidental right. By forcing federal prosecutors to 
try these cases in a timely manner, the Act prevents a violation of the 
Sixth Amendment and the implementation of the draconian incidental 
right of dismissal. 
A successful example of a state response to a Court-created pro­
phylactic rule is California's response to the Court's invitation in 
Anders v. California1 18 to implement an alternative procedure to pro­
tect an indigent defendant's constitutional right to appellate counsel 
when his claims appear frivolous. The California Supreme Court took 
up the challenge in People v. Wende,1 1 9 and the Court last term in 
Robbins was fully satisfied with these alternative procedures.12° 
There has also been some Court-Congress dialogue regarding the 
constitutional incidental right of the exclusion of evidence taken in 
violation of the Fourth Amendment, though unlike the two examples 
noted above, no successful enactment of alternative procedures. The 
exclusionary remedy has obvious disadvantages; it benefits solely 
guilty persons, does nothing to safeguard the privacy rights of innocent 
persons, and may create a windfall for the guilty party that is out of 
proportion to the gravity of the Fourth Amendment violation and the 
gravity of the defendant's crime.121 Thus, Congress proposed a bill to 
replace the exclusionary remedy with a monetary damages scheme.122 I 
have noted elsewhere that this proposal is clearly inadequate due to, 
among other things, its low cap on monetary damages, and its ad hoc 
jury verdicts rather than the written judicial opinions necessary to 
guide officer conduct.123 Professor Akhil Amar has suggested a more 
comprehensive set of remedies, including enterprise liability, the abo­
lition of official immunities, and a sentencing discount for convicted 
1 17. Federal Speedy Trial Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-619, 88 Stat. 2076 (1975) (codified 
at 18 U.S.C. §§ 3161-74, 3152-56 (1994)). The Speedy Trial Act was adopted in direct re­
sponse to the Supreme Court's suggestion in Barker that setting specific time limits was part 
of the legislative function. See H.R. REP. NO. 93-1508 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
7401 , 7405 ("With respect to providing specified time periods in which a defendant must be 
brought to trial, the Court in Barker . . .  said . . .  'such a result would require this Court to 
engage in legislative or rulemaking activity . . .  .' "). 
1 18. 386 U.S. 738 (1967). 
1 19. 600 P.2d 1071 (Cal. 1979). 
120. See supra note 56. 
121. See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, Rethinking the Fourth Amendment, 1981 SUP. Cr. 
REV. 49; Christopher Slobogin, Why Liberals Should Chuck the Exclusionary Rule, 1999 U. 
ILL. L.  REV. 363. 
122. See H. 666 and S. 3, 104 Cong. (1995). 
123. See Klein, supra note 26, at 549. 
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defendants.124 Such a proposal may come close enough to serving the 
same function as the constitutional incidental right to exclusion of evi­
dence to be accepted by the Court, particularly if the civil damage 
remedy were supplemented with an automatic award of attorneys fees 
and the exclusion from the civil jury trial of evidence of criminality 
discovered during the search.125 Moreover, we would still need some 
method for imposing categorical rules that law enforcement personnel 
can follow. Still, the potential for a federal or state legislatively de­
signed alternative constitutional incident is possible. 
One example of dismal failure of a prophylactic rule to foster a 
constructive and respectful exchange between Congress and the Court 
is the Miranda decision itself. The Court earnestly denied subjecting 
law enforcement to a "constitutional straightjacket,'' and invited 
"Congress and the States to . . .  search for . . .  other procedures which 
are at least as effective."126 As Professor Yale Kamisar vividly de­
scribed in his Cornell article last year,127 Congress enacted 18 U.S. 
Code § 3501 in 1968 not in response to this request for alternatives but 
simply to overrule a decision it loathed. The Court reacted to this an­
gry, disrespectful, and disingenuous attempt to overrule a constitu­
tional prophylactic rule it didn't care for exactly as one would ex­
pect.128 This should not be the end of the matter, however. One can 
imagine numerous plausible candidates for the Court's request for 
"adequate protective devices."129 Professors Amar and Lettow have 
suggested questioning by a magistrate;130 I have earlier suggested pro­
viding an attorney in the interrogation room;131 and scholars have long 
suggested videotaping all custodial interrogations.132 A variant of 
124. See AKHIL REED AMAR, THE CONSTITUTIONAL AND CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: 
FIRST PRINCIPLES (1997). 
125. To ask a judge or jury to put out of her mind that the defendant is a criminal is to 
ask too much, and has already resulted in the skewing of Fourth Amendment doctrine. 
126. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467 (1966). 
127. Yale Kamisar, Can (Did) Congress "Overrule" Miranda?, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 883 
(2000). 
128. See United States v. Dickerson, 120 S. Ct. 2326 (2000) (striking down the federal 
statute, 7-2, as unconstitutional). 
129. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 532. 
130. See Akhil Reed Amar & Renee B. Letlow, Fifth Amendment First Principles: The 
Self-Incrimination Clause, 93 MICH. L. REV. 857 (1995). This was first suggested 60 years 
earlier by Dean Pound. Roscoe Pound, Legal Interrogation of Persons Accused or Suspected 
of Crime, J. AM. INST. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1014 (1933). 
131. See Klein, supra note 3. 
132. See, e.g., Yale Kamisar, Foreword: Brewer v. Williams - A Hard Look at a Dis­
comfiting Record, 66 GEO. L.J. 209, 236-43 (1977); Richard A. Leo, The Impact of Miranda 
Revisited, 86 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 621, 681-91 (1996) (arguing that substantive due 
process requires that the Court legally mandate the electronic-recording of custodial inter­
rogations in all felony cases); Glanville Williams, The Authentication of Statements to the Po­
lice, 1979 CRIM. L. REV. 6, 7, 15. 
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Professor Amar's position133 would likely achieve all three benefits of 
the Court's constitutional prophylactic rule in that it would dispel the 
compulsion inherent in the custodial interrogation, provide guidance 
to police officers, and make it possible for the Court to rule on this is­
sue. A magistrate is unlikely, however, to engage in the false sympa­
thy, intimidation and fabrication necessary to obtain incriminating 
statements.134 Likewise, putting attorneys in the interrogation room 
would fulfill all three functions of the prophylactic rule but again 
would detrimentally over-protect the self incrimination privilege -
few attorneys would allow their clients to speak. 
Videotaping confessions start to finish captures false and coerced 
confessions in a way Miranda never can. Videotaping, nonetheless, is 
not an alternative that adequately replaces the Miranda warnings. It 
may dispel some of the compulsion inherent in a custodial setting, as­
suming the defendant knows that it is recording and believes that it 
cannot be tampered with later, since officers are less likely to beat 
suspects on video. It offers no guidance, however, to police officers as 
to what kind of conduct is permitted, and it puts the Court right back 
into the same totality of circumstances boat it was drifting in prior to 
Miranda. Unlike in First Amendment cases involving obscene videos, 
courts will be unwilling to view hours and hours of tedious videotaped 
interrogations in every case involving a statement (assuming that 
judges even knew what they were looking for). They will still need 
some method for narrowing the class of cases. Videotaping plus a list 
of unacceptable police tactics would do nicely. 
In revisiting past and developing future prophylactic rules and in­
cidental rights, the dialogue I envision between the Court, Congress, 
state legislators, federal and state law enforcement agencies, and state 
judges should be possible if all parties act in good faith and treat each 
other with respect. Perhaps I am insufficiently cynical, but I believe 
such dialogue may fruitfully occur if the Court makes its invitation 
genuine. It is true that neither state nor federal legislatures are trip­
ping over themselves to enforce constitutional criminal procedural 
133. The variant would eliminate the magistrate's contempt power to compel an answer 
and replace police interrogation with magistrate interrogation rather than supplementing it. 
The problem with Amar's proposal is that without the contempt club we would likely see no 
confessions at all, and with the contempt club and the sworn testimony we violate the 
Framers' understanding of the Fifth Amendment. This is why the number of scholars who 
suggested unsworn interrogation before a magistrate years before Amar and Lettow's article 
suggested that the only sanction for a suspect's refusal to comply with the magistrate was to 
permit the trier of fact to consider that silence, and even that was thought to require a consti­
tutional amendment for implementation. See, e.g., WALTER V. SCHAEFER, THE SUSPECT 
AND SOCIETY: CRIMINAL PROCEDURE AND CONVERGING CONSTITUTIONAL DOCTRINES 
78 (1967); Henry J. Friendly, The Fifth Amendment Tomorrow: The Case for Constitutional 
Change, 37 U. CIN. L. REV. 671 (1968); Paul G. Kauper, Judicial Examination of the Accused 
- A  Remedy for the Third Degree, 30 MICH. L. REV. 1224 (1932). 
134. See Klein, supra note 26, at 554. 
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guarantees that benefit persons suspected of crime.135 However, it is 
possible that nonjudicial state and federal actors wiil create and adopt 
procedures that separate the guilty from the innocent, rather than pro­
cedures that separate the very guilty from the less guilty, or that pro­
tect values not associated with the truth-seeking function of criminal 
trials. Even the most hawkishly "tough-on-crime" legislator should 
have little interest in incarcerating the innocent.136 I have also noticed 
some interest by legislatures in eliminating the appearance of racism 
in the criminal justice system, even when these measures do not neces­
sarily separate the guilty from the innocent.137 Finally, threatened 
Court action (indicating that it will generate a rule or right if another 
branch fails to do so) might provide the necessary impetus. In any 
case, it seems to me we have nothing to lose by giving it a try. If the 
other branches fail to act, the Court can continue to fashion the pro­
phylactic rules, safe harbor rules, and incidental rights it finds neces­
sary. If other government actors introduce implausible alternative 
procedures that will defeat constitutional rights, the Court can simply 
ignore such mischievous legislative behavior or declare the alterna­
tives inadequate.138 
135. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 667 (West Supp. 1996) ("Three Strikes and You're 
Out"); Donald A. Dripps, Criminal Procedure, Footnote Four, and the Theory of Public 
Choice; Or, Why Don't Legislatures Give a Damn About the Rights of the Accused?, 44 
SYRACUSE L. REV. 1079 (1993), Harry A. Chernoff et al., The Politics of Crime, 33 HARV. J. 
ON LEGIS. 527, 535-38 (1996) (detailing the Willie Horton fiasco). 
136. Even my home state of Texas, not known for coddling criminals, is likely to enact a 
bill proposed by Sen. Rodney Ellis which requires the state to fund DNA testing of arrestees 
and convicted felons where appropriate. Likewise, the Department of Justice has set up 
committees to examine the use of DNA to free wrongfully convicted person, and the proper 
procedures to eliminate mistaken eyewitness identifications. Dep't of Just., Postconviction 
DNA Testing: Recommendations for Handling Requests (Sept. 1999) (identifying 68 cases of 
wrongfully convicted person exonerated by DNA evidence, and encouraging "the pursuit of 
truth over the invocation of appellate time bars."); Eyewitness Evidence, supra note 1 14. 
Congress is presently considering the Innocence Protection Act of 2000, H.R. 4167. Many of 
my suggestions for social science research in Section Il.B, infra, concern criminal procedures 
that would improve accuracy. 
137. See, e.g., President's Memorandum on Fairness in Law Enforcement, 35 WEEKLY 
COMP. PRES. Doc. 1067 (President William J. Clinton) (June 9, 1999) (directing federal 
agencies to collect and report statistics relating to race, ethnicity, and gender for law en­
forcement activities); U.S. ATI'YS MANUAL § 9-10.050 (1998) (requiring Committee ap­
pointed by Attorney General to consider whether racial bias played any role in decision to 
seek federal death penalty); Letter from Att'y Gen. Janet Reno and Barry McCaffery to 
President Clinton (July 3, 1997), reprinted in 10 FED. SENT. REP. 192, 193 (1998) (describing 
a proposal by the Department of Justice and the Office of National Drug Control Policy to 
decrease the powder to crack cocaine ratio from 100:1 to 10:1); S. 146, 106th Cong. (1999) 
(Republican bills incorporating a ten-to-one ratio); S. 5, 106th Cong. (1999) (same); H.R. 
939, 106th Cong. (1999) (Democratic bills treating crack and powdered cocaine as equiva­
lents); H.R. 1241, 106th Cong. (1999) (same); 66 BNA CRIM. L. REP. 13, (Jan. 5, 2000) (de­
tailing New Jersey Governor Christine Todd Whitman's consent decree). 
138. For example, 18 U.S.C. § 3501 was properly ignored by the Department of Justice, 
under both Democratic and Republican administrations, for many years. Though the 
Republicans did put some of their tirades into writing, they never implemented a policy to 
seek Supreme Court reversal of Miranda on this ground (though a few Assistant United 
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B. Fostering a Dialogue Between the Court, Empiricists, 
and Social Scientists 
Properly understood, a prophylactic rule or incidental right comes 
into play when the Court finds that it cannot otherwise protect a par­
ticular constitutional clause. · Although in such situations some pro­
phylactic rule is necessary, no particular rule is required - only one 
that is "effective." This permits the Court to create new prophylactic 
rules and incidental rights as changed circumstances and new data 
generated by social scientists mandate. It also allows the Court to 
change the rules by accepting alternate rules provided by Congress, 
state legislators, federal and state law enforcement agencies and state 
judges, who may have better knowledge of the circumstances encoun­
tered or facts on the ground, and who may be better institutionally­
suited to play factfinder. Finally, labeling the procedures prophylactic 
rather than true constitutional interpretation permits the Court to de­
termine the occasions when the rule comes into play. For example, the 
Court need not apply a prophylactic rule retroactively,139 it need not 
be cognizable on habeas, 140 and it may create exceptions to the rule, if 
employing the rule in those situations or without exceptions is unnec­
essary or would involve unacceptable costs. 
Let us examine how the Miranda exceptions are consistent with my 
conception of prophylactic rules, and how social scientists might better 
States Attorneys made the attempt at the lower court level). It was only after a contrivance 
by a particular Assistant United States Attorney and a conservative law professor that § 
3501 reared its ugly head in Dickerson. 
139. See, e.g. , Michigan v. Payne, 412 U.S. 47 (1973) (refusing to apply the prophylactic 
rule developed in Pearce retroactively to a case still on direct appeal); Johnson v. New Jer­
sey, 384 U.S. 719 (1966) (holding that Miranda would not apply retroactively). 
140. While the Court can also refuse to provide relief for a "true" constitutional viola­
tion retroactively or on habeas, such action is more difficult to justify, particularly on the 
grounds of costs. The Court in Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976) and Withrow v. Williams, 
507 U.S. 680 (1993) came pretty close to treating the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule 
as an incidental right and the Miranda warnings as a prophylactic rule, and thus properly 
analyzing whether the extension of the right or rule is necessary on habeas and explaining 
the different outcomes. For example, the Powell Court noted that there is little marginal 
benefit to enforcing what I call the incidental right of exclusion because it comes too late to 
produce a noticeable deterrent effect. Powell, 428 U.S. at 493. Thus, under my conceptual 
framework, it does not deter future violations of the Fourth Amendment nor make the de­
fendant whole. Likewise, its cost is unacceptable, as the extension of the right to habeas 
" 'divert[s attention) from the ultimate question of guilt,' squanders scarce federal judicial 
resources, intrudes on the interest of finality, creates friction between the state and federal 
systems of justice, and upsets the 'constitutional balance upon which the doctrine of federal­
ism is founded.' " Withrow, 507 U.S. at 701-02. In contrast, the extension of Miranda's pro­
phylactic rule to habeas directly advances one of the values underlying the Self­
Incrimination Clause: the exclusion of untrustworthy confessions. Moreover, the cost of the 
extension is acceptable, as "eliminating review of Miranda claims would not significantly 
benefit the federal courts in their exercise of habeas jurisdiction, or advance the cause of 
federalism in any substantial way . . .  [as] virtually all Miranda claims would simply be re­
cast" as due process claims. Withrow, 507 U.S. at 693. 
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inform the Court regarding these exceptions. All but one the Miranda 
exceptions can be explained by returning to my definition of a pro­
phylactic rule. The explicit federal constitutional right at issue is the 
privilege against self-incrimination. A constitutional prophylactic rule 
is appropriate only upon two determinations: first, that providing re­
lief only upon a showing that the explicit right was violated is ineffec­
tive; and second, that the rule will be effective while involving only ac­
ceptable costs. Providing relief only upon a showing that a statement 
was compelled is ineffective; the Court was unable to determine when 
the self-incrimination right was violated because of the posthoc nature 
of the inquiry, because the totality of the circumstances test required 
the Court to examine too many facts in too many case, and because 
the judicial results of implementing the totality of the circumstances 
test provides no guidance to police officers for future conduct. I turn 
now to the second showing, that the prophylactic rules is appropriate 
because Miranda warnings are relatively effective in enforcing the ex­
plicit constitutional right at issue, and involve only acceptable costs. 
Every Supreme Court case blessing the use of statements taken in 
violation of Miranda at a criminal trial except New York v. Quarles in­
volved a good faith or unintentional violation of the prophylactic 
rule, 141 coupled with particularly high costs for implementing the rule. 
Where officers are trying to obey the dictates of Miranda, exceptions 
to the prophylactic rule may be acceptable.142 An unintentional viola­
tion of Miranda would be less likely to lead to a coercive interroga­
tion,. and there will be so few of these that the Court will not be inun­
dated with the due process totality of the circumstances claims it 
sought to prevent by instituting the Miranda prophylactic rule. 
On the other hand, powerful costs are associated with applying the 
prophylactic rule in these cases. For example, in Harris the Court bal­
anced the utility of the prophylactic rule against the serious costs of "a 
141. See Duckworth v. Eagan, 492 U.S. 195 (1989) (noting that an unintentional depar­
ture from the precise language laid out in the Miranda opinion does not render warnings 
inadequate where they reasonably convey to the suspect his right to an attorney); Oregon v. 
Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 309, 315 (1984) (noting that the officer failed to give Miranda warnings 
because he was unaware that a defendant questioned in his own home was in "custody" and 
that the officer's failure to Mirandize "may have been the result of confusion as to whether 
the brief exchange qualified as 'custodial interrogation' "); Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433 
(1974) (noting that, because the questioning in Tucker occurred before Miranda was an­
nounced and otherwise conducted in an objectively reasonable manner, the exclusion of the 
derivative evidence solely for failure to comply with the nonexistent Miranda requirement 
would not significantly deter Miranda violations); Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971) 
(noting that the interrogation in Harris took place on January 7, 1966, about six months be­
fore Miranda was handed down on June 13, 1966). 
142. I believe this position is consistent with my suggestion in an earlier article that a 
deliberate Miranda violation constitute a proper basis for a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action. See 
Klein, supra note 3. 
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license to use perjury by way of a defense."143 In Michigan v. Tucker,144 
the Court balanced the unintentional Miranda violation against a liv­
ing individual witness's voluntary decision to testify.145 In Elstad the 
Court weighed the unintentional failure to warn against the value to 
the truth seeking function of the trial of admitting a fully voluntary 
statement attenuated by time and an adequate Miranda warning from 
the initial statement in violation of the prophylactic rule.146 
The case of New York v. Quarles,147 where the police intentionally 
refused to Mirandize a suspect because they believed that public 
safety demanded the information they sought, raises more difficult is­
sues. One could justify it on the grounds that the Fifth Amendment 
itself must yield to public safety issues. No constitutional right is ab­
solute, and one could plausibly argue if a suspect refused to reveal 
where he had planted a bomb in the schoolyard the Constitution might 
tolerate some level of coercion to compel the defendant to reveal its 
location.148 Even in the absence of a public safety exception to the 
Fifth Amendment, a single exception allowing an intentional Miranda 
violation will not negate the effectiveness of the rule.149 In the vast 
majority of instances, officers will continue to give the Miranda warn­
ings because no public safety issue looms, and they know they will lose 
the statement without the warnings. Where danger to the community 
(like the loaded gun lying unprotected in an open supermarket in 
Quarles) is imminent, it seems to me the officers are going to ask ques­
tions without Mirandizing regardless of whether this triggers the pro-
143. Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 226 (1971). However, Harris was informed of his 
right to remain silent, and the assistant district attorney questioning Harris asked Harris if he 
wanted to speak to an attorney at that time; Harris said that he would "call tomorrow" and 
then answered several questions, the answers to which were used to impeach him at trial. See 
People v. Harris, 298 N.Y.S.2d 245, 246 (N.Y. App. Div. 1969). For a scathing criticism, see 
Alan M. Dershowitz & John Hart Ely, Harris v. New York: Some Anxious Observations on 
the Candor and Logic of the Emerging Nixon Majority, 80 YALE L.J. 1198 (1971). 
144. 417 U.S. 433 (1974). 
145. Id. ; see also United States v. Ceccolini, 435 U.S. 268, 277 (1978) (refusing to exclude 
testimony of live witness). 
146. "Nor did the officers exploit the unwarned admission to pressure respondent into 
waiving his right to remain silent." Elstad, 470 U.S. at 316. 
147. 467 U.S. 649 (1984) (holding 5-4 that the public safety exception to Miranda allows 
admission of statement in case-in-chief). 
148. Just as one does not have a First Amendment free speech right to yell "fire" in a 
crowded movie theater. Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919). 
149. See, e.g. , United States v. Colon-Osorio, 877 F. Supp. 771 (D. Puerto Rico 1994) 
(no public safety exception where officers see gun); Fleming v. Collins, 954 F. 2d 1 109 (5th 
Cir. 1 992) (en bane) (public safety exception applied where officers asked bank robber who 
shot guard "where is the gun?"). But see United States v. Edwards, 885 F. 2d 377 (7th Cir. 
1989) (exception applied where officer asked drug sale arrestee whether he had a gun). 
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phylactic rule requiring exclusion. As with Terry frisks,150 safety will 
seem more important and certainly more immediate than the future 
result of a suppression hearing. 
If the other exceptions to Miranda, however, are permitted after 
intentional Miranda violations, the Court risks turning the exclusion of 
evidence in a prosecutor's case-in-chief for a Miranda violation from a 
sanction for misconduct into a price well worth paying in exchange for 
the derivative and impeachment evidence obtained. 151 At that point 
the exceptions have swallowed up the rule; the rule no longer enforces 
the explicit federal constitutional right - here the protection against 
violation of the privilege against self-incrimination - and it no longer 
guides officers' conduct. Should the rule become ineffective in this 
manner, the Court would regress to deciding each case based on the 
totality of the circumstances - exactly what it was trying to avoid by 
crafting the prophylactic rule in the first place. To determine whether 
this is occurring, the Court should examine social science scholarship, 
such as Charles Weisselberg's study of California's law enforcement 
practices regarding interrogation,152 and reach its best guess on the 
question of whether, as an empirical matter, Miranda is being ignored 
often enough that it fails to function as a prophylactic rule. If the 
Court determines that the exceptions encourage violations of the rule, 
it may limit these exceptions to unintentional violations, and apply the 
per se exclusion to all uses of evidence obtained by intentional viola­
tions.153 
Greater interaction between the Court and social scientists would 
be useful not only in determining when to carve out exceptions to a 
prophylactic rule, but in modifying existing prophylactic rules and in­
cidental rights or formulating new ones.154 One prime candidate for a 
150. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) (permitting brief detention without warrant based 
upon reasonable suspicion of criminal activity, permitting frisk without warrant based upon 
reasonable suspicion that the suspect is armed and dangerous). 
151.  See Sharon L. Davies, The Penalty for Exclusion - A Price or Sanction?, 73 S. 
CAL. L. REV. 1275 (2000) (discussing the Fourth Amendment exclusionary sanction); Klein, 
supra note 3 (discussing exceptions to Miranda). 
152. Charles D.  Weisselberg, Saving Miranda, 84 CORNELL L. REV. 109 (1998) (citing 
numerous examples); Charles D. Weisselberg,, In the Stationhouse After Dickerson, 99 
MICH. L. REV. 1063 (2001) (examining police training on Miranda's exceptions in Califor­
nia); see also Klein, supra note 3 (recognizing this problem for the first time). 
153. Lower courts have generally been utilizing the Court's exceptions for unintentional 
violations even for intentional ones, without noticing the difference or doing any kind of 
analysis on the effect of such widespread application of the exceptions. See, e.g. , People v. 
Peevy, 953 P.2d 1212 (Cal.), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1042 (1998) (holding that statements taken 
after deliberate Miranda violations may still be used to impeach a testifying defendant). But 
see United States v. Orso, 234 F. 3d 436 (9th Cir. 2000). 
154. Safe harbor rules might also be modified based upon empirical data. Consider, for 
example, the Court's per se rule regarding searches of the passenger compartment of an 
automobile made incident to an arrest. Suppose a well-designed empirical study in a number 
of locales revealed that weapons or evidence of the crime were found during these searches 
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new prophylactic rule would be procedures to protect a defendant's 
right to a fair trial in light of the unreliability of eyewitness testimony. 
While social science now establishes that human memory will mistake 
a later-seen picture for an original incident,155 that witness confidence 
is weakly related to accuracy, and that cross-racial identifications are 
particularly unreliable,156 the jury will never learn this.157 An increasing 
number of studies have shown misidentification to be one of the most 
frequent causes of the conviction of the innocent.158 By one estimate, 
there are 5,000 erroneous convictions per year due to eyewitness mis-
in less than one-half of one percent of the cases. Alternatively, suppose the study concluded 
that officers were more likely to be injured by searching in the field rather than arresting the 
defendant and allowing his friend to depart with the car. The Court might change this par­
ticular safe harbor rule, as a bright line rule may no longer be necessary to protect the officer 
or ensure against the destruction of evidence. It may instead make sense to institute a rebut­
table presumption against searching the passenger compartment of an automobile unless the 
officer can articulate a reason for the search, or demonstrate the safety of such a search. 
155. See, e.g., Brian L. Cutler et al., Jury Sensitivity to Eye Witness Identification 
Evidence, 14 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 185 (1990); Roger B. Handberg, Expert Testimony on 
Eyewitness Identification: A New Pair of Glasses for the Jury, 32 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1013 
(1995) (offering a scientific explanation of why eyewitness identification is often inaccurate); 
Michael M. Hoffheimer, Requiring Jury Instructions on Eyewitness Identification Evidence at 
Federal Criminal Trials, 80 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 585 (1989) (listing many sociologi­
cal and psychological studies documenting the problem of eye witness identification). 
156. See Sheri Lynn Johnson, Cross-Racial Identification Errors in Criminal Cases, 69 
CORNELL L. REV. 934 (1984); Daniel Levin, Race as a Visual Feature, 129 J. EXPER. PYSCH.: 
GENERAL 559 (2000). 
157. While some federal and state courts give cautionary instructions, see, e.g. , Jones v. 
Smith, 772 F.2d 668 (11th Cir. 1985); People v. Wright, 729 P.2d 280 (Cal. 1987), many leave 
it to the trial judge's discretion or consider it inappropriate, see, e.g. , United States v. Tipton, 
11 F.3d 602 (6th Cir. 1993); Commonwealth v. Hyatt, 647 N.E.2d 1 168 (Mass. 1995). Moreo­
ver, such jury instructions do not reveal the social science data; rather, they merely inform 
the jury that identification testimony depends upon the opportunity of the witness to ob­
serve and may have been influenced by the circumstances of the identification. The weight 
of authority disallows expert testimony of misidentification, on the grounds that the subject 
matter is not beyond the ken of the average layperson, or would have undue influence upon 
the jury. See, e.g. , United States v. Larkin, 978 F.2d 964 (7th Cir. 1992); Rodriguez v. Com­
monwealth, 455 S.E.2d 724 (Va. Ct. App. 1995). 
158. See Hugo Adam Bedau & Michael L. Radelet, Miscarriages of Justice in Potentially 
Capital Cases, 40 STAN. L. REV. 21 (1987) (documenting 17 cases in the 1970s and 1980s in 
which convicted capital murder defendants were subsequently shown to be probably inno­
cent); Daniel Givelber, Meaningless Acquittals, Meaningful Convictions: Do We Reliably 
Acquit the Innocent?, 49 RUTGERS L. REV. 1317 (1997) (providing a lengthy and shocking 
review of studies documenting erroneous convictions, some resulting in execution of prison­
ers, some resulting in release); Edward Connors et al., Convicted by Juries, Exonerated by 
Science: Case Studies in the use of DNA Evidence to Establish Innocence After Trial, Nat'! 
Inst. of Just., U.S. Dep't of Just. (1996) (report of 28 defendants improperly convicted on the 
basis of inaccurate eye witness testimony later exonerated by DNA evidence); Nat'! 
Comm'n on the Future of DNA Evidence, U.S. Dep't of Just., Recommendations for Han­
dling Requests, (1999) (finding 40 additional cases of convicted defendants exonerated by 
DNA); 1 1(10) BNA CRIM. PRACTICE MANUAL 184 (May 7, 1997) (noting the DNA testing 
done by the FBI for state and local labs from 1989 to 1996 positively excluded 25 to 27 per­
cent of the defendants tested); Elizabeth F. Loftus, Ten Years in the Life of an Expert Wit­
ness, 10 LAW & HUM. BEHA v. 241, 243 (1986) (estimating that one-half of wrongful convic­
tions are due to misidentification). 
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identification.159 The best candidate for countering these injustices is a 
new rule and/or an alternative to the right to counsel prophylactic rule 
imposed by Wade160 that would require proper procedures and guide­
lines for lineups, showups, and photo arrays.161 Because suggestive 
lineups lead to mistaken identifications and cause high witness cer­
tainty, because juries believe confident eyewitnesses, and because an 
attorney can do little at the actual line-up to cure the suggestion or 
later on cross-examination to shake this strongly held but erroneous 
belief,162 a proper lineup beats the right to counsel at lineup (at least 
for an innocent defendant) hands-down. Other plausible candidates 
for such an alternative to Wade's prophylactic rule include cautionary 
jury instructions163 and expert testimony164 though these devices miti­
gate rather than prevent the damage. 
An area ripe for additional incidental rights is the selective prose­
cution doctrine. Sufficient social science and empirical data support 
the proposition that blacks suffer from racial profiling in detentions 
and arrests,165 much higher rates of criminal prosecution, and signifi-
159. See BRIAN CUTLER & STEVEN PENROD, MISTAKEN IDENTIFICATION (1995). 
160. Solely as an alternative to the counsel provided by Wade, this procedure would 
solve only a small part of the problem. In the wake of Wade, police departments engage in 
line-ups pre-formal charge, see Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682 (1972), and conduct photo ar­
rays post-formal charge, see United States v. Ash, 413 U.S. 300 (1973). Were this new proce­
dure to apply to all witness confrontations, life or picture, pre- or post-indictment, such a 
procedure would be vastly superior to the right to counsel offered in Wade. Counsel at a 
lineup has no authority to object to suggestive procedures, and if he sees any, he must with­
draw as counsel to become a witness for his former client. More importantly, once the wit­
ness makes an erroneous identification based upon a suggestive identification procedure, it 
becomes ingrained in her mind. An ounce of prevention in terms of proper procedures that 
prevent false positives is worth a pound of cure in the form of exclusion of the out-of-court 
(but rarely the in-court) identification. 
161 .  See, e.g., Gary L. Wells et al., Eyewitness Identification Procedures, Recommenda­
tions for Lineups and Photospreads, 22 LAW & HUM. BEHAV., No. 6, at 1 (1998) (making 
four recommendations: (1)  that the lineup or photo array be conducted by officer who is un­
aware of the identity of the suspect, (2) that the eyewitness be told that the culprit might not 
be in the lineup or photo array, (3) that the suspect should not stand out in the lineup or 
photo array, and (4) that a confidence statement should be taken from the eyewitness at the 
time of the identification). 
162. See generally WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 7.l(a)-(e) (2d 
ed. 1999). 
163. See, e.g., Hoffheimer, supra note 155 (suggesting special jury instructions). 
164. See, e.g., Wayne T. Westling, The Case for Expert Witness Assistance to the Jury in 
Eyewitness Identification Cases, 71 OR. L. REV. 93 (1992) (advocating the use of expert wit­
nesses to explain the unreliability of eyewitness testimony to juries). 
165. See, e.g., David A. Harris, "Driving While Black" and All Other Traffic Offenses: 
The Supreme Court and Pretextual Traffic Stops, 87 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 544 (1997) 
(describing racially-based stops in by the Sheriffs Dept. in Volusia County, Florida; the 
Maryland State Police; the Bureau County, Illinois Police Dept.; and the Sheriff's Dept. in 
Eagle County, Colorado, resulting in civil rights lawsuits); Civil Rights Bureau, Off. of the 
Att'y Gen., The New York City Police Department's "Stop & Frisk " Practice: A Report from 
the Office of the Attorney General (Dec. 1 ,  1999) (collecting racial breakdown on stops and 
frisks). 
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cantly harsher sentences than whites,166 that the Court should accept a 
legislatively imposed evidentiary presumption of selective prosecution 
based solely on a showing of disparate impact. This new prophylactic 
rule would replace the Court requirement, from United States v. 
Armstrong,167 that a defendant is not entitled to discovery on his selec­
tive prosecution claim without establishing similarly-situated white in­
dividuals who were not prosecuted, a standard nearly impossible for a 
defendant to meet. 
I am not suggesting here that the Court use social science and em­
pirical data to discover the constitutional norm or value underlying a 
particular clause, nor to develop the constitutional rule itself.168 
Rather, I am suggesting that regardless of the method of constitutional 
interpretation used to develop the constitutional norm (be it Framers' 
intent, textualism, a balancing of interest approach, individual rights 
based liberalism, or anything else), social science and empirical data 
can assist the Court in developing the subsidiary rules and rights nec­
essary to protect that norm, value, or rule. Thus I agree wholeheart­
edly with the claims by Professors Merritt169 and Rubin170 that the util-
166. See, e.g., David Sklansky, Cocaine, Race, and Equal Protection, 47 STAN. L. REV. 
1283 (1995) (noting that punishment for crack cocaine, favored by black Americans, is 100 
times more severe than punishment for powder cocaine, the form enjoyed by middle-class 
whites); Richard C. Dieter, The Death Penalty in Black and White: Who Lives, Who Dies, 
and Who Decides, Death Penalty Info. Ctr., Washington, D.C. (1998) (noting that blacks in 
Philadelphia are four times more likely to receive a death sentence than whites, and that 
100% of inmates on death row in Kentucky murdered white victims, despite fact that over 
1 ,000 blacks became murder victims during the same time period); Marc Mauer & Tracy 
Huling, Young Black Americans and the Criminal Justice System: Five Years Later, The 
Sentencing Project, Washington, D.C. (1995) (reporting that a twenty- to twenty-nine-year­
old African-American male had a 30.2% chance of being under criminal justice control on 
any given day of 1994). 
167. See discussion supra note 94. 
168. Commentators calling for the use of social science research in constitutional deci­
sionmaking include Tracey L. Meares & Bernard E. Harcourt, Forward: Transparent 
Adjudication and Social Science Research in Constitutional Criminal Procedure, 90 J. CRIM. 
L. & CRIMINOLOGY 733, 736 (2000) ("Theoretical principles cannot properly resolve diffi­
cult criminal procedure cases without the assistance of empirical evidence"); Michael C. 
Dorf, Forward: The Limits of Socratic Deliberation, 112 HARV. L. REV. 4 (1998) (suggesting 
that the Court should consider the social consequences of its decision); David L. Faigman, 
"Normative Constitutional Fact-Finding": Exploring the Empirical Component of 
Constitutional Interpretation, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 541, 612 (1991) (opining that the "Court's 
empirical myopia" undermines its legitimacy); Richard A. Posner, Against Constitutional 
Theory, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1 (1989) (suggesting weakness in constitutional decisions is not 
lack of theory but inattention to empirical evidence). 
169. See, e.g., Deborah Jones Merritt, Constitutional Fact and Theory: A Response to 
Chief Judge Posner, 97 MICH. L. REV. 1287 (1999) (suggesting that empirical exploration 
unmasks constitutional theory, social science discoveries can influence and inform the sub­
stance of constitutional theory, and social science can stimulate a dialogue between legal 
academics and social researchers); Deborah Jones Merritt, The Future of Bakke: Will Social 
Science Matter?, 59 OHIO ST. L.J. 1055 (1998). 
170. See, e.g., Edward J. Rubin, Law and the Methodology of Law, 1997 WIS. L. REV. 
521. 
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ity of social science is limited to informing legal decisionmaking, not 
determining the content of legal doctrine or constitutional theory. The 
· Court must first have a theory of what the explicitly constitutional 
clause is about, and must be able to articulate why, due to its own in­
stitutional limitations or the limitations of others, the prophylactic rule 
or incidental right is necessary to protect the explicit constitutional 
clause. Once the Court develops its theory and articulates its limita­
tions, however, designing any necessary prophylactic rule, safe harbor, 
or incidental right can be informed and assisted by social science re­
search. The great advantage of using modifications of prophylactic 
rules and incidental rights to reflect changes in data and circumstance 
is that we shore up the constitutional value without tarnishing the con­
stitution itself with inconsistent decisions and frequent reversals. 
Undeniably, the use of empiricism and social science data by the 
Court is risky, even in the more limited manner I propose. The Court 
often does a bad job of evaluating the data, as it did when it turned to 
social science to determine whether a six-member jury functioned in 
the same manner as the twelve-member one.171 Moreover, there is 
quite a bit of unreliable junk science and advocacy statistics out 
there.172 Finally, social scientists also tend to give different answers to 
the same questions, depending upon when they are asked.173 
One answer to this criticism that the Court is not particularly good 
at factfinding is that the Court is going to utilize social science data 
anyway, even in explicit constitutional interpretation,174 and at least 
prophylactic rules and incidental rights are more easily modified.175 A 
171. See Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78 (1970). The Court's dismal performance in this 
case was chronicled by Michael J. Saks, Ignorance of Science is No Excuse, TRIAL, Nov.-Dec. 
1974 at 18. The Court seemed to regret this case when it came to a different conclusion in 
evaluating the constitutionality of five member juries in criminal trials. See Ballew v. Geor­
gia, 435 U.S. 223 (1978). 
172. See, e.g. , Michael J. Saks, Merlin and Solomon: Lessons from the Law's Formative 
Encounters with Forensic Identification Science, 49 HASTINGS L.J. 1069 (1988). 
173. Brown v. Bd. of Educ. , 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (examining social science literature 
documenting the effects of segregation), and United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 ( 1996) 
(holding that gender-based admission to VMI violates Equal Protection, and is not cured by 
separate leadership program for women) are recent examples where the Court got it right. 
The sociological and psychological theories at the time of Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 
(1896), though not explicitly recognized in the opinion, taught that the law was incapable of 
restructuring racial instincts. See generally PAUL L. ROSEN, THE SUPREME COURT AND 
SOCIAL SCIENCE (1972). 
174. See, e.g., ROSEMARY J. ERICKSON & RITA J. SIMON, THE USE OF SOCIAL SCIENCE 
DATA IN SUPREME COURT DECISIONS (1998) (detailing citations of social science data in 19 
of the 35 cases studied in areas of sex discrimination and abortion rights cases before the 
Court between 1972 and 1992); JOHN MONAHAN & LAURENS WALKER, SOCIAL SCIENCE IN 
LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS (2d ed. 1990) (identifying Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 
( 1908) as the Court's first use of social science data). 
175. Another answer suggested by a colleague is to allow the Court to hire its own ex­
perts and commission studies, as was done in West Germany. See Hans W. Baade, Social 
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better answer is that the kind of empirical and social science data 
needed to determine when a prophylactic rule is needed, when to cre­
ate exceptions, and when to jettison or change the rule should in fact · 
come from the legislative branches of the state and federal govern­
ments. A legislature arguably has superior factfinding abilities,176 and 
can consider the whole range of possible cases, whereas the Court 
must consider one case at a time. I agree that bowing to legislative and 
executive findings of facts is preferable. The Court's prophylactic rules 
and incidental rights should be viewed as last-resort and stop-gap 
measures easily replaceable by other federal and state actors. 
C. Caution, Deference, and Truth-in-Labeling 
The system I have suggested will reap all of the benefits of pro­
phylactic rules, safe harbors, and incidental rights and escape most of 
the pitfalls only if the Court is cautious in creating the rules and rights, 
deferential in accepting alternative rules and rights offered by other 
branches of the federal government and by state actors, and clear in 
identifying procedures as entailing prophylactic rules or incidental 
rights fully open to revision (or safe harbors presumptively not open 
to revision). Caution requires that the Court generate prophylactic 
rules and incidental rights only when absolutely necessary. Moreover, 
before acting the Court should clearly warn the other branches of the 
federal and state governments in the appropriate cases that they must 
act to prevent a Court-imposed rule or right. This warning should be 
coupled with patience, such that action is taken only after long-term 
failure by the coequal branches.177 
Appropriate deference suggests that the Court accept alternative 
rules and rights proposed by other federal and state actors if they can 
plausibly be characterized as effective. As previously noted, the Court 
reasonably accepted California's alternative approach to frivolous ap­
peals in Robbins,178 and correctly rejected a clearly inadequate alterna­
tive to the Miranda warnings in Dickerson.179 The Court should ex­
amine proposed prophylactic rules with the goal of protecting the 
constitutional clause at issue with the smallest amount of overprotec­
tion possible, and examine safe harbor rules with the goal of easing 
Science Evidence and the Federal Constitutional Court of West Germany, 23 J. POL. 421 
(1961). 
176. On the other hand, one could as plausibly argue that the superior factfinding abili­
ties of legislators is mostly a myth, and that social science in the hands of Congressmen is 
pure advocacy. 
177. Examples of cases where the Court was forced to act are Mapp v. Ohio and 
Miranda v. Arizona, discussed supra notes 104-107 and accompanying text. 
178. See supra note 56. 
179. See supra note 128. 
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adjudication of the constitutional clause at issue with the smallest 
amount of underprotection. The deference accorded a legislative or 
executive branch-designed prophylactic rule or incidental right that 
constrains those branch actors and overprotect the Constitution 
should not be afforded to legislative or executive-branch attempt to 
create a safe harbor rule that allows those branch actors to violate the 
federal constitution. Permitting a state or federal actor to bind itself to 
procedures that are in individual cases more stringent than what the 
federal constitution demands will not be subject to the abuse that we 
might see if we allow federal and state actors to exempt themselves 
from the federal Constitution via safe harbor rules. The political pres­
sure to create rules which make law enforcement more effective at the 
expense of individual liberties will be intense. 
One difficulty with expecting other branches to ignore Court­
created rules and rights in favor of alternative ones is that Article III 
does not permit federal courts to issue advisory opinions.180 State and 
federal actors will not always be able to predict whether a particular 
substitute prophylactic rule or incidental right will be deemed ade­
quate by the Court. A state may be leery of trying a new procedure 
with a serious criminal, who may not be chargeable or who may be 
released if the prophylactic rule or incidental right was not "adequate" 
or "effective" in the Court's judgment. One answer is to use the pro­
cedure or right first in a misdemeanor trial as a test case. That will not 
always be possible, as once a statute is enacted (if that is the form of a 
particular rule) is it out of the legislature's control, and it may take 
many years for a test case to wend its way to the Court. Another 
method of encouraging innovation by the other branches is for the 
Court to strike down an inadequate rule or right prospectively only, 
preserving not only final convictions obtained pursuant to that dis­
carded rule or right, but preserving all cases where an official actor re­
lied upon the discarded rule or right up to the date it was stricken.181 
Additionally, to preserve the particular conviction at bar, the Court 
might craft some form of good faith exception to uphold criminal con­
victions in spite of what the Court declares to be an inadequate rule or 
right and therefore a constitutional violation. 182 
180. U.S. CONST. art. III ,  § 2. See also PAUL BATOR ET. AL., THE FEDERAL COURTS 
AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 65-66 (2d ed. 1973); Nashville, Cincinnati v. St. Louis Railway 
v. Wallace, 288 U.S. 249 (1933) (holding that declaratory judgment procedures do not consti­
tute advisory opinions and are constitutional). This problem will not arise when a legislature 
or law enforcement agency creates a new prophylactic rule or incidental right rather than a 
substitute one. 
181. See, e.g., Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 458 n.4 (1974) (Brennan, J. ,  concurring) 
(noting that "[t]he trend of our decisions since Johnson has thus been toward placing in­
creased emphasis upon the point at which law enforcement personnel initially relied upon 
the discarded constitutional standards"). 
182. See, e.g., United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984) (admitting evidence taken in 
violation of the Fourth Amendment where officer reasonably relied in good faith on an in-
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Finally, the Court must practice what I call truth-in-labeling. The 
dialogue, experimentation, and responsiveness to social science and 
empirical data I envision cannot occur if prophylactic rules and inci­
dental rights are unrecognized as such. This candor is further neces­
sary to defeat two potential problems with my conceptual framework: 
rules and rights might mutate into pure constitutional interpretation; 
and prophylactic rules may become a substitute for rather than a pro­
tector of the constitutional norm. For example, what I thought at one 
time was a benefit of Miranda - its symbolic value - may be viewed 
as a detriment. The Dickerson Court, in refusing to label the Miranda 
warnings either a prophylactic rule or pure constitutional interpreta­
tion, noted that it has "become embedded in routine police practice to 
the point where the warnings have become part of our national cul­
ture. "183 Hardening a prophylactic rule into a constitutional command 
would defeat one of its primary advantages - it can be modified by 
the Court without spending the institutional capital necessary for a 
constitutional reversals, and it can be modified by other branch actors 
as better alternatives arise. As there is probably no single criminal 
procedure case as famous as Miranda, I believe few run-of-the-mill 
prophylactic rules or incidental rights will suffer such a fate. More­
over, such transformation is not necessarily a disadvantage, so long as 
the transformation is recognized and acknowledged by all actors. 
The second problem is trickier. It does appear to me that some 
lower courts have used the Miranda warnings as a substitute for the 
required constitutional analysis a court must undertake before admit­
ting any confession or statement regardless of whether the defendant 
was Mirandized - a finding that the statement was given voluntar­
ily.184 In other words, the litigation focus on whether the prophylactic 
procedure was followed may deflect attention away from the core con­
stitutional value at issue, rather than shining light upon it. My concep­
tual framework will not function successfully unless the Court first 
clearly explains to other federal and state actors the value underlying 
each constitutional clause, and then indicates precisely what it is at­
tempting to accomplish in suggesting or promulgating the rule or right. 
valid search warrant); Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1 (1995) (admitting marijuana taken dur­
ing search incident to an arrest where officers reasonably and in good faith relied upon an 
arrest warrant erroneously listed in a court computer record). 
183. Dickerson v. United States, 120 S. Ct. 2326, 2336 (2000). 
184. Several commentators have noticed that as long as Miranda is followed, lower 
courts do not inquire into the voluntariness of the resulting confession. See, e.g. , Alfredo 
Garcia, Is Miranda Dead, Was it Overruled, Or Is It Irrelevant?, 10 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 461, 
499-502 (1998), Richard A. Leo, Miranda and the Problems of False Confessions, in THE 
MIRANDA DEBATE: LAW, JUSTICE AND POLICING 276-77 (Richard A. Leo & George c. 
Thomas III eds., 1998). 
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III. THE COURT'S FAILURES IN DICKERSON V. UNITED STA TES 
The Court did none of these things in Dickerson. This opinion was, 
in a word, terrible. The Court, when squarely faced with the issue of 
whether the four Miranda warnings were required by the federal con­
stitution, not only refused to answer coherently, but breached its duty 
to provide a justification for Miranda or Dickerson and squandered an 
opportunity to rationalize contradictory case law regarding Miranda's 
exceptions. It could have written a well-reasoned decision either over­
turning Miranda (cheered by the naive right), reconstitutionalizing 
Miranda and reversing Miranda's exceptions (cheered by the naive 
left), or affirming Miranda and justifying Miranda's exceptions by ac­
knowledging Miranda as a prophylactic rule, as I have suggested in 
Parts I and II of this essay (cheered by the center, as this maintains the 
current regulation of police questioning but holds out the promise of 
alternative procedures that might be an improvement). Chief Justice 
Rehnquist rejects all three of these options and, in an apparent com­
promise between the right and left wings of the Court, holds by judi­
cial fiat that the law is to stay exactly as it was pre-Dickerson. While 
this is ostensibly a victory for the liberal wing of the Court, because 
Miranda is relatively ineffective at dispelling coercion, and because 
Dickerson forecloses any opportunity for improvement in protecting 
the privilege against self-incrimination, the decision is, in fact, a boon 
for those, like Chief Justice Rehnquist, far to the right of center.185 
As Professor Schulhofer demonstrated in this Symposium,186 a 
Court decision to reconstitutionalize Miranda could be easily justified 
and convincingly written. The Court need only have stated that all 
statements taken during custodial interrogation in the absence of 
Miranda warnings are always "compelled" within in the meaning of 
185. Professor William J. Stuntz argues as much in this Symposium. William J. Stuntz, 
Miranda's Mistake, 99 MICH. L. REV. 975 (2001). A number of scholars, myself included, 
noticed this prior to Dickerson. See, e.g., DA YID SIMON, HOMICIDE: A YEAR ON THE 
KILLING STREETS 199 (1991) (noting that if the "intent of the Miranda decision was, in fact, 
an attempt to 'dispel the compelling atmosphere' of an interrogation, then it failed misera­
bly"); Peter Arenella, Miranda Stories, 20 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 375 (1997) (suggesting 
that the warnings do not provide much protection against police pressure); Laurence A. 
Benner, Requiem for Miranda: The Rehnquist Court's Voluntariness Doctrine in Historical 
Perspective, 67 WASH. U. L.Q. 59 (1988) (noting that Miranda was, in fact, quite a retreat 
from the counsel required during custodial interrogations implied by Escobedo); Klein, su­
pra note 3, at 424 ("[T)he Miranda decision is best viewed as a compromise between com­
peting interests."); Stephen A. Saltzburg, Miranda v. Arizona Revisited: Constitutional Law 
or Judicial Fiat, 26 WASHBURN L.J. 1 (1986) (suggesting that Miranda favored law enforce­
ment). 
186. Stephen J. Schulhofer, Miranda, Dickerson, and the Puzzling Persistence of Fifth 
Amendment Exceptionalism, 99 MICH. L. REV. 941 (2001); see also Michigari v. Tucker, 417 
U.S. 433 (1974) (Douglas, J., dissenting); Charles J. Ogletree, Are Confessions Really Good 
for the Soul? A Proposal to Mirandize Miranda, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1826 (1987); Schulhofer, 
supra note 53; Welsh S. White, Defending Miranda: A Reply to Professor Caplan, 39 V AND. 
L. REV. 1 (1986). 
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the Fifth Amendment's Self-Incrimination Clause, exactly as are 
statements taken after an employer's threat to discharge a public em­
ployee, 187 and statements taken after a judge's threat to impose crimi­
nal contempt proceedings.188 Since compelled statements are inadmis­
sible in a criminal trial for any purpose without exception,189 such a 
holding would require the Court to reverse all of those cases permit­
ting the introduction of statements taken in violation of Miranda for 
impeachment, to rebut the insanity defense, to develop new leads, and 
to use at sentencing, as those cases were based on the now erroneous 
premise that the Miranda warnings were "not themselves rights pro­
tected by the Constitution. "190 
As a second option, the Dickerson Court could have reversed 
Miranda and admitting it had been deconstitutionalized by subsequent 
decisions. Though I believe such a holding would have been wrong, 
this is a defensible position which resulted in a plausible dissent. 
Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Thomas, concluded that since a viola­
tion of Miranda does not itself offend the Fifth Amendment, the 
Court has no power to reverse state convictions based upon Miranda 
violations. Miranda's exceptions obviously become unnecessary, and 
contradictory case law regarding Miranda's status is resolved. A model 
opinion reversing Miranda would also have contained an explanation 
of why prophylactic rules are unconstitutional (though at least Justice 
Scalia acknowledged the issue), and might eventually lead to the re­
versal of these many prophylactic rules in constitutional criminal pro­
cedure. 
Unwilling either to constitutionalize or to reverse Miranda, the 
Dickerson majority asserted that the Miranda doctrine has "constitu­
tional underpinnings,"191 yet at the same time "the disadvantage of the 
187. See Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493 (1967) (holding that a statement given by 
police officers in response to the threat of removal from office if they asserted their privilege 
may not be used against them in subsequent criminal trial); see also Lefkowitz v. 
Cunningham, 431 U.S. 801 (1977); Lefkowitz v. Turley, 414 U.S. 70 (1973). 
188. See Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441 (1972). Additionally, the Court has held 
it always constitutes compulsion to speak (and therefore a violation of the privilege) for the 
prosecutor or judge to comment adversely on the defendant's silence. See Griffin v. 
California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965). 
189. See, e.g., Portash v. New Jersey, 440 U.S. 450 (1979) (distinguishing Harris and 
holding that statements compelled during grand jury proceeding by threat of criminal con­
tempt cannot be used for impeachment in a later criminal case). The Court never asks, for 
example, whether a particular public employee was "actually" compelled to make a state­
ment upon threat of discharge or whether the statement was instead voluntary in some 
sense. And the Court never asks whether a defendant might have chosen not to take the 
stand despite a prosecutor's comment on the invocation of his right. Once the Court deter­
mines that statements were taken under those circumstances, they are always excluded. 
190. Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 444 (1974). Such a holding would also bar the 
admittance of the "fruits" of compelled statements. 
191. Dickerson v. United States, 120 S. Ct. 2326, 2334 n.5 (2000). 
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Miranda rule is that statements which may be by no means involun­
tary . . .  may nonetheless be excluded and a guilty defendant go free as 
a result."192 If the rule is in fact broader than the Fifth Amendment, 
Chief Justice Rehnquist ought to justify reversing a state criminal con­
viction based upon the state court admitting a statement that did not 
violate the privilege against Self-Incrimination. If the rule is a constitu­
tional one, Chief Justice Rehnquist ought to explain the exceptions 
admitting evidence taken in violation of the constitution.193 Instead, in 
his non-answer to the question of why the traditional fruits doctrine 
developed in Fourth Amendment cases does not apply to Miranda 
violations, the Chief Justice stated "that unreasonable searches under 
the Fourth Amendment are different from unwarned interrogation 
under the Fifth Amendment."194 This comes dangerously close to be­
ing a non sequitur.195 How are they different, why are they different, 
and how does the Court justify refusing to apply the fruits doctrine to 
what we now know is a real Fifth Amendment Self-Incrimination 
Cause violation? 
The Court could have answered these question by choosing a third 
option, writing a convincing opinion justifying constitutional prophy­
lactic rules, safe harbors, and incidental rights in criminal procedure in 
general and for the Miranda decision in particular. Acknowledging 
Miranda as a prophylactic rule would encourage the Court to be more 
careful and explicit in identifying the factual bases for this rule. This 
would in turn encourage more effective research regarding those bases 
and thus more informed development of the rule (and its exceptions) 
and whether to retain or modify it. From this perspective, Dickerson 
not only falls far short but in fact goes in the wrong direction. We lose 
not only the opportunity to discover whether the Miranda warnings 
are working, but, if Dickerson portends things to come, we may suffer 
this same loss with regard to the other prophylactic rules and inciden­
tal rights. 
An ideal opinion under my conceptual framework would have 
done the following. First, the Court would have told us exactly what 
the privilege against self-incrimination requires, before determining 
whether we still need Miranda's prophylactic rule to effectively pre-
192. Id. at 2336. 
193. See, e.g. , id. at 2337 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (castigating the majority for refusing to 
bring Dickerson into the "mainstream of legal reasoning" by holding that a custodial inter­
rogation not proceeded by the Miranda warnings violates the Constitution). 
194. Id. at 2335. 
195. As Justice Scalia pointed out in his dissent, since it not clear on the face of the 
Fourth Amendment that evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment must be 
excluded from trial, whereas it is clear from the face of the Fifth Amendment that compelled 
confessions must be excluded, if anything the argument for excluding fruits of Self­
Incrimination Clause violations is considerably stronger. 
1074 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 99:1030 
serve and adjudicate that privilege. That it prohibits a "compelled"196 
statement, or one given after the defendant's "will was overborne"197 is 
insufficient. In contrast to the per se rules the Court has given us on 
being fired from a government job, use of a subpoena, comment upon 
a defendant's silence, and threat of contempt, all of which constitute 
compulsion in every case,198 the Court has never well defined these 
terms in the context of police interrogation, custodial or otherwise. 
Without a definition of "compulsion," we cannot know when it is 
"dispelled," much less what procedures are adequate to dispel it. 
Every interrogation involves some amount of pressure to talk, how 
much pressure is too much, and what kinds of pressure are accept­
able? Is an admission influenced by a misunderstanding of the law de­
fining criminal responsibility (the felony murder rule for example) in­
voluntary? Is an admission influenced by the anxiety generated by 
hostile police officers involuntary? It seems likely to me that as a 
philosophical matter, defining voluntariness is inherently impossible.199 
Even accepting the notion of free will, there is no objective baseline 
for what types of pressure are "coercive," that term is a moral judg­
ment about what kinds of conduct are tolerated and what kinds are 
wrongful. Perhaps either the present due process totality of the cir-
196. See, e.g., Malinski v. New York, 324 U.S. 401, 404 (1945); see also Malloy v. Hogan, 
378 U.S. 1 (1964). 
197. See, e.g., Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 226 (1973); Haynes v. Washing­
ton, 373 U.S. 503 (1963); Ashcroft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143 (1944); Bram v. United States, 
168 U.S. 532 (1897) (holding that the confession must be free and voluntary). The terms 
"compelled" and "involuntary" are used interchangeably by the Court. See Lawrence Her­
man, The Unexplored Relationship Between the Privilege Against Compulsory Self­
Incrimination and the Involuntary Confession Rule (Part II) , 53 OHIO ST. L.J. 497 (1992); 
Lawrence Herman, The Unexplored Relationship Between the Privilege Against Compulsory 
Self-Incrimination and the Involuntary Confession Rule (Part /), 53 OHIO ST. L.J. 101, 551 
(1992). But see Schulhofer, supra note 53 (advocating separate analyses and separate tests 
for the Fifth Amendment and the Due Process Clause). 
198. See cases cited supra notes 187-189. 
199. See, e.g., Albert W. Alschuler, Constraint and Confession, 74 DENY. U. L. REV. 957 
(1997) (suggesting that country lawyers, often better philosophers than philosophers are, 
know that the term "coercion" cannot be defined); Yale Kamisar, What is an "Involuntary" 
Confession? Some Comments on lnbau and Reid's Criminal Interrogation and Confessions, 
17 RUTGERS L. REV. 728, 747 (1963) ("To call the 'voluntariness' terminology loose and un­
revealing is not the worst that can be said for it. It can also be downright misleading."); Louis 
Michael Seidman, Rubashov 's Question: Self-Incrimination and the Problem of Coerced 
Preferences, 2 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 149 (1990) (arguing against social constructionist view 
on grounds that actor may have no preferences independent of social interaction); George 
C. Thomas III ,  A Philosophical Account of Coerced Self-Incrimination, 5 YALE J.L. & 
HUMAN. 79 (1993) (outlining four theories of coercion: empirical, normative, positive lib­
erty. and social constructionist); George C. Thomas III, Miranda: The Crime, the Man, and 
the Law of Confessions, in MIRANDA DEBATE: LAW, JUSTICE AND POLICING 7 ( Richard A. 
Leo & George C. Thomas III eds., 1998) (suggesting that defining voluntariness is "a philo­
sophical or psychological problem of the first magnitude"). 
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cumstances test200 or a set of per se prohibitions on certain police prac­
tices we find morally offensive201 is the best Court can do. 
Second, the Court should have reiterated the bases for Miranda's 
prophylactic rule and used the available empirical data and social sci­
ence research to support the proposition that these bases are still fur­
thered by the rule. The Court appears to believe that the Miranda re­
quirements are designed to dispel the compulsion inherent in custodial 
interrogations and assure that such compelled statements do not influ­
ence the determination of the defendant's guilt; to ease the Court's 
adjudication as to whether particular confessions were compelled; and 
to guide officers in conducting custodial interrogations.202 The 
Miranda warnings are then a supplement to the due process totality of 
circumstances test, in that they make any resulting statement more 
likely to be actually voluntary, give the Court one more factor to 
weigh on the voluntary side of the scale when it must decide whether 
to admit the statement, and provide a procedure for all officers to fol­
low. Arguably, there is more and better information available at the 
time of Dickerson to determine how well the Miranda prophylactic 
rule works. To determine whether Miranda is working, the Court 
should have examined empirical data as to whether defendant's are 
now confessing "voluntarily" as opposed to "involuntarily." This, of 
course, would have required a definition of compulsion or when the 
will is overborne. To be fair to the Court, even if we had such a defini­
tion, social science research has provided little information as to why 
defendants' make pre- or post-Miranda incriminating statements. 
Richard Leo's work comes the closest,203 though he focuses more on 
what the interrogating officers did and how the defendants responded 
200. See Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 226 (the totality of the circumstances test examines 
"both the characteristics of the accused and the details of the interrogation"). 
201. See infra note 205. 
202. If the Court were to decide that the warnings, instead of or in addition to dispelling 
compulsion, are designed to reduce the number of false confessions, it should examine the 
empirical data on such confessions to see if the warnings are effective. If Miranda is under­
protective, new prophylactic rules may be designed that prohibit those tactics likely to pro­
duce a false confession from an innocent suspect. See, e.g., Richard A. Leo & Richard J. 
Ofshe, The Consequences of False Confessions: Deprivations of Liberty and Miscarriages of 
Justice in the Age of Psychological Interrogation, 88 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 429 (1998) 
(detailing specific instances of false confessions); Richard J. Ofshe & Richard A. Leo, The 
Decision to Confess Falsely: Rational Choice and Irrational Action, 74 DENY. U. L. REV. 979 
(1997); Welsh S. White, Miranda's Failure to Restrain Pernicious Interrogation Practices, 99 
MICH. L. REV. 1211 (2001) (suggesting limits on threats of punishment, promises of leniency, 
threats of adverse consequences to loved ones, and misrepresenting the evidence, as these 
tend to produce false or untrustworthy confessions). 
203. See, e.g., Richard A. Leo & Welsh S. White, Adapting to Miranda: Modern Interro­
gators' Strategies for Dealing with the Obstacles Posed by Miranda," 84 MINN. L. REV. 397 
(1999); Richard A. Leo, Inside the Interrogation Room, 86 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 266 
(1996) [hereinafter Leo, Inside Interrogation]. 
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and not directly on why the suspects confessed.204 Designing a study to 
isolate why defendants confess would be incredibly difficult, and may 
have led an honest Court to develop a new set of prophylactic rules 
that focus entirely on the objective behavior of officers, outlawing 
those forms of interrogation likely to induce a rationale person not in­
clined to confess to do so nonetheless, or simply outlawing those prac­
tices it finds particularly offensive.205 
Finally, had the Dickerson Court both followed my approach and 
been entirely frank, it might have admitted that Miranda's prophylac­
tic rule post-Dickerson is different from the prophylactic rule origi­
nally created in Miranda. In 1966, the Miranda Court probably be­
lieved all suspects would invoke their right to an attorney, and that it 
was in essence extending the Escobedo v. Illinois206 ruling requiring at­
torneys for "prime suspects" to the stationhouse. The intuitive predic­
tion was that most suspects would in fact request an attorney, and the 
warnings were a relatively incidental part of the process of imple­
menting an attorney regime. As it turned out, defendants routinely 
waived their Miranda rights and gave incriminating statements with-
204. Part of the problem is that the available empirical data focuses primarily on 
whether Miranda has decreased confessions or clearance rates. Compare Paul G. Cassell & 
Richard Fowles, Handcuffing the Cops? A Thirty-Year Perspective on Miranda 's Harmful 
Effect on Law Enforcement, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1055 (1998), with Stephen J. Schulhofer, 
Miranda 's Practical Effect: Substantial Benefits and Vanishingly Small Social Costs, 90 NW. 
U. L. REV. 500 (1996). While I would not be surprised to learn that the Self-Incrimination 
Clause decreases the number of confessions and perhaps convictions (that latter proposition 
depends upon how many defendants waive their rights and whether officers obtain convic­
tions by using other evidence), just as the Fourth Amendment's rule against unreasonable 
search and seizures and the Sixth Amendment requirement of effective counsel probably 
decrease the number of convictions, it seems to me this data is entirely irrelevant to the 
question of whether Miranda dispels compulsion. These statistics on post-Miranda confes­
sion and clearance rates are relevant, however, to a discussion as to how far to extend the 
prophylactic rule, and whether and how to design exceptions to it. 
205. See, e.g., Alschuler, supra note 199 (suggesting that Court shift attention away from 
the mind of the suspect and determine which interrogation techniques are improper, such as 
threats of harm, promises or leniency, and the fabrication of incriminating evidence); Welsh 
S. White, False Confessions and the Constitution: Safeguards Against Untrustworthy Confes­
sion, 32 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 105, 149-53 (1997) (arguing that the Due Process Clause 
should establish a five hour maximum period of police interrogation, and that suspects 
should be informed of this at the outset); Welsh S. White, Police Trickery in Inducing Con­
fessions, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 581 (1979) (arguing that Miranda ought to be interpreted to 
prohibit certain deceptive interrogation tactics). 
206. 378 U.S. 478 (1964). The Escobedo Court held that the Sixth Amendment's right to 
assistance of counsel extended preindictment to police interrogations of prime suspects. See 
id. at 490-91 . At the time, commentators predicted that Escobedo would effectively bar un­
counseled interrogations, thus eliminating confessions. See e.g. , Yale Kamisar, Brewer v. 
Williams, Massiah, and Miranda: What is "Interrogation"? When Does it Matter?, in YALE 
KAMISAR, POLICE INTERROGATION AND CONFESSIONS: ESSAYS IN LAW AND POLICY 161 
n.26 (1980) (summarizing predictions of commentators concerning Escobedo's impact). In­
stead, Escobedo was subsequently limited to its peculiar facts. See Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 
682, 689 ( 1972) ("[T]he Court has limited the holding of Escobedo to its own facts."). 
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out counsel.207 Thus, the warnings themselves have become the pri­
mary Miranda right. Chief Justice Rehnquist's fidelity to stare decisis 
is therefore quite disingenuous. The Court reaffirmed Miranda in 
Dickerson only because it turned out not to negatively impact law en­
forcement. An honest Court would have asked whether a requirement 
of counsel should be reaffirmed because it has evolved into a useful 
set of warning requirements. 
The Court picked the worst of all possible worlds when it froze in 
place the status quo, without explaining how the Miranda warnings 
can have "constitutional underpinnings"208 yet, unlike other constitu­
tional violations, be ignored at will. The answer to this, of course, is to 
label Miranda a prophylactic rule necessary only in certain circum­
stances. The Court all but foreclosed this option, and squelched any 
opportunity for dialogue between the Court ahd other branches of the 
federal and state governments, by flatly stating that Congress "may 
not supersede this Court's decisions interpreting and applying the 
Constitution."209 To top it off, the Court intimated that the Miranda 
decision itself was a mistake,210 (without identifying that mistake or 
telling us why it was a mistake) but that it is better to be consistent 
than to be right. 
CONCLUSION 
Had the Dickerson Court properly labeled Miranda a prophylactic 
rule . designed to protect and adjudicate Fifth Amendment self­
incrimination claims, this might have engendered agreement upon or 
at least opened debate concerning exactly what the Self-Incrimination 
Clause is designed to accomplish and how best to implement the 
privilege in the stationhouse. More importantly, my conceptual 
framework, in addition to accounting for Miranda and the subsequent 
development of its exceptions, accounts for the many other prophylac­
tic rules, safe harbors, and incidental rights in constitutional criminal 
procedure. Finally, rather than either reversing Miranda and poten­
tially every other prophylactic rule, safe harbor rule, and incidental 
right, or freezing such rules and rights and their exceptions as "true" 
constitutional interpretation, frankly labeling them as prophylactic 
rules or incidental rights protecting the Fifth or some other 
207. By most accounts, roughly 80% of suspects waive their Miranda rights, and the 
majority go on to incriminate themselves. See, e.g., Paul G. Cassell & Bret S. Hayman, Police 
Interrogation in the 1990s: An Empirical Study of the Effects of Miranda, 43 UCLA L. REV. 
839 (1996); Leo, Inside Interrogation, supra note 203. 
208. Dickerson v. United States, 120 S. Ct. 2326, 2334 n.5 (2000). 
209. Id. at 2332 (citing City of Boerne). 
210. See id. at 2336 ("Whether or not this Court would agree with Miranda's reasoning 
and its rule in the first instance, stare decisis weighs heavily against overruling it now."). 
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Amendment has numerous advantages. It allows the Court to over­
turn a rule without spending the institutional capital of a constitutional 
reversal, fosters free and open discussion between the Court and state 
and federal legislators, stimulates social science and empirical re­
search, and encourages the Court and state and federal legislators to 
experiment with different and competing rules and remedies. 
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APPENDIX A 
VENN DIAGRAM OF PROPHYLACTIC RULE 
Prophylactic Rule of Miranda 
(4 warnings) 
Cops delivered 








*Prophylactic rule does not 
underprotect; statement 
suppressed on Fifth and 
Fourteenth Amendment grounds. 
Fifth Amendment Privilege 
Against Self-Incrimination 
(no compelled statements) 
Cops violated 
Miranda but state­
ment was NOT 
compelled (officer 
forgot to deliver 
fourth warning to 
wealthy law profes­
sor )t 
If cops follow the 
rule, this area very 
small 
tProphylactic rule does 
overprotect; government 
out of luck (statement 
successfully suppressed). 
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APPENDIX B 
VENN DIAGRAM OF SAFE HARBOR RULE 
Safe Harbor Rule of Belton 
(search incident to arrest includes 
passenger compartment of 
automobile) 
. , ,  .. _ ; : 
s611bJ:f oi16�edb�i ·. 
search rionetheless ' .· . . 
unreas()n�bie > <:: 
.. . .  (drivei is haiid-: · . . · •.. . cuffed 100 fe�tfroin. 
. . 
: .... If.Court designs this 
rule wen,•this area . . 
•. Very small 
. 
*Safe Harbor rule does 
underprotect; defendant out of 
luck (evidence admitted 
pursuant to Fourth Amendment). 
Fourth Amendment Right 
Against Unreasonable 
Searches and Seizures 
tSafe Harbor rule does not 
overprotect; evidence 
admitted under exigent 
circumstances or automobile 
exceptions to warrant 
requirement. 
